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THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRIVATE 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
Yitzhak Hadari* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
FROM the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, society has experienced the persistent tendency of business organizations 
to expand. Businesses evolved from the rural workshop to the urban 
factory; from the municipal firm to the regional firm and then to 
the national enterprise. More recently, enterprises have expanded 
even further, from national firms with small export outlets to huge 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) embracing business operations 
all over the globe coordinated under a single management. Yet, 
along with its beneficial results for the peoples of the world, each 
new economic era brings with it new problems as well. 
The conflict benveen the development of MNEs and the sover-
eign states in which they operate has generated a vast business litera-
ture1 and has also commanded the attention of legal scholars.2 This 
• Member of Law Faculty, University of Tel Aviv. LL.B. 1966, LL.M. 1970, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem; LL.M. 1971, S.J.D. 1972, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
© Copyright 19711 Yitzhak Hadari. This is the first of two Articles on multinational 
enterprises. The concluding Article is still in preparation. These Articles are based on 
a doctoral dissertation submitted to The University of Michigan Law School. The re-
mainder of the dissertation deals primarily with tax issues concerning the multinational 
enterprise. A small portion of the tax discussion provided the basis for an earlier Article, 
Hadari, Tax Treaties and Their Role in the Financial Planning of the Multinational 
Enterprise, 20 AM. J. CoMP. L. 111 (1972). 
The author wishes to thank Professors Eric Stein and Stanley Siegel of The Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School for their valuable comments and assistance. The 
author also wishes to thank The University of Michigan Law School for the generous 
support which enabled this sllldy. 
I. See, e.g., J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
(1970) [hereinafter J. BEHRMAN]; R. HELLMANN, THE CHALLENGE TO U.S. DOMINANCE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (1971); C. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 
(1969) [hereinafter C. KINDLEBERGER]; THE INTERNATIONAL CoRPORATION (C. Kindleber-
ger ed. 1970) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CoRPORATION]; THE MULTINATIONAL CoR-
PORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (S. Rolfe &: w. Damm ed. 1970) (collected papers 
presented at the Conference on Direct Investment in the Atlantic Area) [hereinafter 
s. Rolfe &: w. Damm]; R. VERNON, SoVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1971) [hereinafter R. VERNON]. 
2. Angelo, Multinational Corporate Enterprise, 1968-III ACADEMIE DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES CouRS 44!1 (1970) [hereinafter Angelo]: Fatouros, The 
Computer and the Mud Hut: Notes on Multinational Enterprise in Developing Coun-
tries, IO CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 335 (1971) [hereinafter Fatouros]; Goldberg&: Kindle-
berger, Toward a GATT for Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the Inter-
national Corporation, 2 LAw &: POLICY INTL. Bus. 295 (1970) [hereinafter Goldberg &: 
Kindleberger]; Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's 
Analysis, !I LAW &: POLICY INTL. Bus. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Rubin]; Vagts, The Global 
Corporation and International Law, 6 J. INTL. L. &: EcoN. 247 (1972); Vagts, The 
[731] 
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Article does not deal with the socio-political and economic conflicts 
between these enterprises and sovereign states.8 Rather, its focus 
will be on the new legal dimensions sparked by the emergence of 
MNEs and the applicability of current legal concepts to their opera-
tions. 
A thorough understanding of the structure and operation of 
these enterprises and their business attributes is a prerequisite to an 
analysis of the impact of a wide variety of laws on the MNE and 
to an appreciation of the challenges these enterprises provide for 
both national legal systems and the rules of public international 
law. Illustratively, scholarly preoccupation with such basic questions 
as the extraterritorial jurisdiction of nations4 may be misdirected 
as l<:mg as it ignores the new structural and operational attributes of 
MNEs. The business and legal structure of these enterprises is the 
key factor in the evolution of corporate, tax, and economic regula-
tory law, which ultimately will control the development of the 
MNE.5 
Consequently, this Article will be devoted primarily to the 
establishment of a framework within which the impact and charac-
teristics of the MNE may be considered. A second Article, currently 
in preparation~_ will then consider the applicability and validity of 
specific legal concepts to the MNE. Thus, rather than emphasizing 
orthodox concepts, these Articles will attempt to formulate new 
rules that will enable states to exercise effective control over vast 
MNEs while, at the same time, encouraging the development of 
the MNE as the most advanced instrumentality for promoting the 
well-being and increasing the standard of living of the peoples of all 
nations. 
Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV, L. REv, 
739 (1970) [hereinafter Vagts). 
3. For a discussion of these conflicts, see, in addition to literature cited in notes 
I & 2 supra, Hearings on the Multinational Corporation and International Invest-
ment Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic 
Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 (1970) [hereinafter MNE Hearings]; FOREIGN 
OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCfURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
THE SmucruRE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY (1968) [hereinafter WATKINS REPoRT]. See also 
Litvak & Maule, The Multinational Corporation: Some Economic and Political-Legal 
Implications, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 631 (1971). 
4. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFrY-FIRSr CONFER• 
ENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF REsTRICTIVE 
TRADE LEGISLATION 348 (1964); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 
1964-I ACADEMIE DE DROlT INTERNATIONAL, REcuEIL DES CoURS I (1964). 
5. See Wells, The Multinational Business Enterprise: What Kind of International 
Or~anitation?, 2S INTL. ORGANIZATION 447 (1971). 
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II. THE PRIVATE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN PERSPECTIVE 
A. The New World Economy 
A new world economy is evolving primarily because of the inter-
nationalization of production.6 Its eventual structure and dimensions 
remain to be determined by political, governmental, and legal devel-
opments.7 It is apparent that "[a] startling and ... new phenomenon 
ha[s] suddenly appeared on the economic horizon."8 
As a result of foreign direct investment, global international pro-
duction approximates 450 billion dollars, about one sixth of aggre-
gate world production.9 This international production includes more 
than 200 billion dollars in output from investment activities in which 
American firms are engaged abroad and 100 billion dollars arising 
from foreign investments in the United States.10 The balance of 150 
billion dollars represents international production by other countries 
not involving the United States.11 Foreign direct investment is cur-
rently increasing at a rate of about ten per cent per year, exceeding 
the growth rate of most nations.12 By the end of the century, this 
international1 or multinational, output may well be equivalent to 
worldwide production that is not internationalized.13 
It is no new phenomenon for the economic interests of nations to 
extend beyond their territorial boundaries. Nor do socio-political 
conflicts necessarily arise out of such across-the-border activities. But 
there are two important differences between previous investment 
activity and current developments.14 One is quantitative: the size and 
extent of the ownership of foreign assets surpass previous experiences. 
The second is qualitative: today, the principal medium through 
6. Rolfe, The International Corporation in Perspective [hereinafter Rolfe], in S. Rolfe 
&: ·w. Damm, supra note 1, at 6. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 770 (Statement of Judd Polk, United States 
Council, International Chamber of Commerce). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Polk, The New World Economy, 3 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1968, at 
7-8 [hereinafter Polk]. 
13. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 770 (Statement of Judd Polk). However, cau-
tion is warranted. There are insufficient data available to evaluate fully this new 
phenomenon, and not all of the data presently available are sensitive to the emergence 
of the new world economy. See Roback &: Simmonds, International Business: How 
Big Is It-The Missing Measurements, 5 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., May-June 1970, at 6 
[hereinafter Roback 8c Simmonds]. 
14. Vernon, Multinational Enterprise and National Security, 74 .ApELPHl P;\PERS l 
(1971) (hereinafter National Securit7J. 
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which foreign assets are accumulated is the MNE, an enterprise with 
headquarters in the home country (the base country or the investing 
country) that maintains operating units in foreign countries (the host 
countries).15 Investments by MNEs differ from traditional inter-
national investments because "[t]hose of the multinational enter-
prise are directed and managed day to day according to some business 
strategy which links those assets to others all over the globe."16 
This second distinction has had particularly important ramifica-
tions for well-established principles of international trade. As one 
commentator has noted, the traditional theory of comparative ad-
vantage assumed 
that while products move internationally, factors of production 
generally do not .... 
The classical doctrine furnished a most powerful support for 
liberalizing national trade policies, and this policy is no less impor-
tant in our day than it was in the last century. But in all honesty we 
must shift our emphasis from a theory that argues the benefits of 
international trade to one which focuses on how to obtain an opti-
mum international allocation of resources in a world in which pro-
ductive factors-especially capital-move with considerable ease 
among nations whose governments are by no means reconciled to the 
phenomenon.17 
In economic terms, "[n]o use of resources is justified if the output 
can be achieved at a lower cost elsewhere."18 Thus, it has been noted 
that United States production abroad results from the interaction of 
American management and financing with foreign factors of produc-
tion through the business network of the MNE.19 The output of 
these combined efforts must be considered as international or mul-
tinational production.20 
15. See text accompanying notes 57-66 infra for a discussion of the business defini-
tion of the MNE and text accompanying notes 146-60 infra for the legal definition. 
Although this Article is directed to private enterprises, see note 147 supra and C. 
FUGLER, MULTINATIONAL PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (1967) [hereinafter C. FUGLER] for a dis-
cussion of multinational public enterprises (some of which are called consortiums). 
16. National Security, supra note 14, at 1. This is a large step beyond the days 
when foreign assets were primarily represented by pieces of paper issued by govern-
ments and economic institutions acknowledging the right of the holder to receive 
funds from the issuer, id. 
17. Polk, supra note 12, at 8-9. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 794-813 (State-
ment of John Dunning, Professor of Economics, University of Reading) for a discus-
sion of the net economic effect of investments by MNEs. 
18. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 796 (Statement of Judd Polk). The major argu-
ments against this economic statement are political in nature, including questions of 
national security. See National Security, supra note 14. 
19. Polk, supra note 12, at 9. 
20. Id. 
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The traditional concept of international trade with its theoretical 
framework-including legal concepts and norms-does not fully 
cover the realities of the emergence of the MNE. One particularly 
striking feature of the "new economy" is that "[c]ountries do not 
export, firms do."21 MNEs export mainly through intraenterprise 
transactions across national borders.22 Thus, even the comparison be-
tween international production and international trade is no longer 
fully meaningful since much exporting consists of intercompany sales 
among different national components of a single MNE. 
One commentator has noted that "the volume of goods and ser-
vices resulting from international investment has bypassed exports, 
and its present growth rate is considerably larger than that of inter-
national trade, thus making international investment the major 
channel of international economic relations."28 Foreign direct invest-
ment may be quite beneficial to the world, for it may culminate in 
the expansion of total world investment and production. The MNE 
promotes economic integration and a better allocation of resources 
on a global basis.24 
B. The Development of the Modern Private 
Multinational Enterprise 
I. Historical Evolution 
International corporate activity is not a recent development, but 
rather the latest step in a well-established economic process. Inter-
national firms have advanced through various distinctive stages. The 
first was the commercial-and-banking era, which dates back to the 
thirteenth century when several trading firms based in Italy main-
tained branches in other European countries.25 This era, extending 
from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance through the age of the 
great explorers to the mid-nineteenth century, included such famous 
participants as the Medicis at its beginning and the Rothchilds at its 
end. The second stage was the exploitative era, extending from about 
1850 to the years just prior to World War I.26 During this period, 
21. Roback &: Simmonds, supra note 13, at 19. 
22. This creates the possibility that the MNE will distort the allocation of income 
and expenses to minimize its taxes through manipulation of transfer prices. See text 
accompanying notes 301-14 infra. Cf. INT. REY. CoDE OF 1954, § 482; Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.482-1 (1962), § 1.482-2 (1968). 
23. Recommendations and Summary, S. Rolfe &: W. Damm, supra note 1, at 107. 
24. Id. 
25. See E. KoLDE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 222 (1968) [hereinafter E. 
KoLDE]. 
26. Id. at 222-23. 
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investment abroad was motivated by the need to secure reliable 
sources of raw materials for the developing industrial revolution. 
Interest turned away from the exotic products that had characterized 
much of the earlier commercial period and focused instead on indus-
trial products such as minerals and ores. This, in turn, led to the 
expansion of colonial rule as countries sought to protect their invest-
ments. The third stage, the concessionary era, extending from the 
pre-World War I period to the end of World War II, was charac-
terized by long-term concession agreements and the decline of 
colonial regimes. The fourth and current stage, to be examined in 
this Article, is the international-manufacturing era that is presently 
dominated by American firms.27 
The uniqueness of the modern MNE is suggested by its dramatic 
contrast with the colonial enterprises of the exploitative era in terms 
of economic patterns as well as legal and political dimensions. 
National governments granted the giant colonial companies the ex-
clusive right to trade with a particular colony and to exercise the 
political powers of the state within that colony. These were not 
only monopolistic companies but, in Maitland's phrase, they were 
"[t]he companies that became colonies, the companies that make 
war."28 These enterprises exploited the colonies to provide raw mate-
rials for the home countries for further manufacture and trade. The 
companies were immune from the import-export laws such as cus-
toms duties, and possessed the power to control international trade. 
They were authorized to tax the colonies, to decide disputes, and to 
defend themselves against pirates and other enemies; thus they ful-
filled the range of governruental functions. Unlike the modem 
MNE, these colonial companies were not integrated into the local 
economy but remained economically and socially isolated. As a re-
sult, most of the beneficial effects of their activities accrued to the 
mother country. 
The forerunner of the modem MNE had its origins in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A notable and early ex-
27. See id. at 221; R. ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS POLICY 1-44 (1964); M. 
WILKINs, THE EMERGENCE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1970); Hawrylyshyn, 
The Internationalization of Firms, 5 J. WoRLD TRAD!!: L. 72 (1971) [hereinafter 
Hawrylyshyn]: Rolfe, supra note 6, at 17. 
28. Maitland, Introduction to 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES 
xxvii (F. Maitland transl. 1913). The British East India Company, the Dutch 
East India Company, the Levant Company, the Hudson Bay Company, and the 
Massachusetts Bay Company were among the more prominent of these companies. 
See generally -P, Eu.sWORTH, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 33 (1964); 8 w. HOLDS· 
WORTH, A HlsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 200-12 (1937); J. MILL, THE HISTORY OF BRITISH 
INDIA (5th ed. 1858) (containing an elaborate history of the East India Company). 
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ample was created when the British Lever Brothers Company merged 
with the Dutch group Margarine Unie to form what is now the MNE 
known as Unilever.29 Lever Brothers acquired facilities for local 
manufacturing and distribution in foreign countries. This was the 
beginning of a multinational structure, and Lever Brothers' succes-
sors developed it into a truly multinational enterprise, which now 
operates in some sixty countries and comprises some 500 companies.30 
Until World War II, there were very few MNEs based in the United 
States.81 The bulk of these American-based transnational activities 
were centered in the petroleum and mining industries.82 
2. Foreign Investment 
The international flow of capital assumes many forms, including 
private direct business investment, private portfolio investment,88 
private long-term export credit, :financial assistance by national 
governments of intergovernmental business organizations, and gov-
ernmental direct investments.H The MNE operates as the main con-
duit for the flow of private direct business investment. 
Direct investment differs from other types of international capital 
movements because it is accompanied by varying degrees of control, 
technology, and management.85 International direct investment in-
volves not only capital movement, but also capital formation through 
borrowing abroad in the local or multinational markets or by ex-
changing tangible or intangible property for equity rights-without 
exchanging funds through foreign capital markets. Direct investment 
29. See E, KoLDE, supra note 25, at 226. 
l!O, Id, Following Unilever's example, other European-based MNEs emerged, such 
as Royal Dutch-Shell, :Philips, Imperial Chemical lnternational, and Nestle. 
81. Id. Several direct investments in Canada, however, have their origin in the 
nineteenth century, of which du Pont and Edison (later known as the Canadian 
General Electric Company) were among the first. H. MARTYN, INrnRNATIONAL BUSINESS 
29 (1964). 
32. E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 226. 
33. Private portfolio investment is the ownership of foreign ~tocks and bonds 
primarily for the return on investmeni rather than as a medium for active participa-
tion in the management of the foreign corporation. E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 219. 
34. This mode of capital flow can take the form of an enterprise that is owned by 
a government or by several governments and engages in activity in several countries. 
It carries out business activities similar to those performed by private enterprises. 
There are also mixed governmental-private direct foreign investments, some of which 
assume the main attributes of private investments such as the Scandinavian Airline 
System. See Angelo, supra note 2, at 471. Although these entities have sometimes been 
referred to as MNEs or multinational corporations, they are beyond the scope of this 
Article. · 
35. E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 219. See C. K.lNDLEBERGER, supra note 1, at I. 
738 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '11:729 
may also take place through the reinvestment of profits.86 Thus, it is 
no surprise to find that foreign direct investment controls37 have had 
less impact on the MNE's investments than experience with foreign 
investments prior to the modern MNE might have suggested. Such 
controls may seriously curb the flow of capital into or out of a coun-
try, and even the use of profits retained abroad for reinvestment, but 
they do not prevent raising money abroad through international or 
multinational financial markets.38 
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's The American Challenge directed 
the attention of the world to the development of the MNE when he 
proclaimed that within fifteen years the world's third-largest produc-
ing unit behind the United States and the Soviet Union may not be 
36. C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 1, at 2-3. Illustratively, the book value of United 
States direct investment abroad increased by 7.1 billion dollars in 1970. This increase 
was partially financed by reinvested earnings of United States-owned foreign cor-
porations that totaled 2.9 billion dollars in 1970. Outflows of direct investment capi-
tal totaled 4.4 billion dollars in 1970, out of which 2.9 billion dollars was borrowed 
abroad by United States corporations; only 1.5 billion dollars was raised in the 
United States. On the other hand, the United States share of earnings, fees, and 
royalties from foreign subsidiaries and affiliates totaled 10.8 billion dollars. Statistics 
based on U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (Oct. 1971) [hereinafter 
SURVEY]. 
37. An example in point is the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations, Exec. 
Order No. 11,387, 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.101-.1405 (1972), 1972 Gen. Bull., 37 Fed. Reg. 
18,294 (1972). Three schedules of countries were established, each with different per-
centages of permitted outflow and required remittances of earnings abroad. 15 C.F.R. 
§ 1000.319 (1972). 
38. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 881 (Testimony of Robert Stobaugh, 
Associate Professor of Business Administration, Harvard University). See also id. at 764 
(Testimony of James W. McKee, Jr., President of CPC International, Inc.). Mr. 
McKee stressed that "[a]lthough most large U.S. multinational corporations have been 
able to make their peace with these controls and have continued to grow abroad, 
there is no question that they have had a distorting and limiting influence." The 
MNEs had to borrow funds in the Euro-dollar markets and local markets abroad. They 
have been able to find the funds abroad, although this process has slowed down the 
rate of investment and has increased interest costs, which in turn have reduced the 
profitability of the investments. American borrowing in Europe increased from 500 
million dollars in 1959 to almost 3 billion dollars in 1969. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrei-
ber noted that "[t]he multinational American corporations ••• are investing our own 
funds in their own development." Id. at 932. See note 36 supra for the 1970 investment 
figures. See also Barovick, United States Firms Have Learned To Live with the OFDI, 
BUSINESS .ABROAD, July 7, 1971. 
A competing "Asia-dollar" market, centered primarily in Singapore, is growing 
at a rapid pace. Many major American banks are opening branches there and are 
accepting dollar deposits from throughout Asia. Although the market has been 
developing only since 1968, nonresident United States-dollar deposits in Singapore 
jumped from 400 million dollars early in 1971 to 900 million dollars by the beginning 
of 1972. Although still tiny as compared to the Euro-dollar market, the infant Asia-
dollar market's potential for growth is thought to be enormous. Asia-dollar deposits 
are forecast to reach 2 billion dollars by the end of 1973, although further growth 
might be more difficult. See THE EcoNOMIST, Jan. 8, 1972, at 62. See also, Martin, 
Here Comes the Asia Dollar, FINANCE, Jan. 1971, at 34; FAR EAsTERN ECON. REV. Y.B. 
1971, at 87. 
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Europe, but American industry in Europe.39 He further noted that 
the European Common Market was, in fact, American in organiza-
tion.40 The post-World War II period of direct international invest-
ment may indeed be termed the American era. While in 1946 
American direct foreign investment amounted to only 7 .2 billion 
dollars, by the end of 1971 that figure was 86 billion dollars, more 
than the combined direct foreign investment of the rest of the 
world.41 
Capital movement, however, does not complete the picture of 
foreign investment abroad. Judd Polk concluded that the value of 
United States production abroad is twice that of American direct 
39. J.-J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE .AMERICAN CHALLENGE 3 (1968). 
40. Id. Mr. Servan-Schreiber, who is a Deputy of the French National Assembly 
and publisher of L'EXPRESS, stated more recently that the real value of American in-
vestment in the EEC stands close to 40 billion dollars. He stated that the American-
based MNEs control ninety-five per cent of total production of integrated circuits-
the basis of the electronics industry, eighty per cent of all electronic calculators and 
computers in Western Europe, and thirty per cent of the automobile business. Not 
only is the European industrial market thus dominated, but more recently the 
capital market has also become subject to American control, primarily through the 
Euro-dollar market. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 931-32 (Testimony of Jean-
Jacques Servan-Schreiber). See R.EPoRT OF THE ECONOMIC CoMMITrEE OF EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, Document 197, Feb. 2, 1970, at 26-30, for a table of the industrial and 
commercial penetration operations in the EEC in 1967. The massive extent of foreign 
(mostly American) investment in Canada is well known. About two thirds of the 
Canadian resource and primary manufacturing industries are controlled by foreigners, 
and approximately three fifths of her secondary manufacturing industry as well. 
MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 915 (Statement of Melville Watkins, Professor of 
Economics, University of Toronto). 
41. The statistics were compiled by the author from various issues of SURVEY, 
supra note 36. In these calculations, figures for direct investment have been obtained 
by adding the book value of equity to the long-term debt of foreign enterprises in which 
the American enterprise holds more than twenty-five per cent of the equity. If these 
book-value figures were adjusted to reflect current values, the result would be double 
or possibly triple the book-value calculation. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 
834, 836 (Statement of Jacques G. Maisonrouge, President, IBM World Trade Corp.). 
The table below, presenting the author's calculations, based on various issues of 
SURVEY, supra note 36, shows the United States direct investment abroad (year-end 
book value, billions of dollars): 
1929 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 
Total 7.5 72. 11.8 19.3 31.9 49.4 78.I 86.0 
Manufacturing 1.8 1.9 3.8 6.3 11.l 19.3 322. 35.5 
Petroleum I.I 1.8 3.4 5.8 10.8 15.3 21.7 24.3 
Mining &: Smelting 12. I.I I.I 22. 3.0 3.9 62. 6.7 
Other Industries 3.4 2.4 3.5 5.0 7.0 10.9 18.0 19.5 
The figures for 1970 are revised and those for 1971 are preliminary. 
See J. VAuPEL &: J. CURHAN, THE MAKING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 125 (1969) 
[hereinafter J. VAUPEL &: J. CURHAN] for a table of the number of foreign manu-
facturing subsidiaries of 187 United States-controlled MNEs in selected years since 
1901. 
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investment abroad.42 Furthermore, because international production 
has surpassed exports and has been increasing at a growth rate ex-
ceeding exports,4'1 international production will continue to exceed 
exports in the world economy; "the primary channel to foreign 
markets is via foreign production rather than exports."44 This trend 
"is underscored when it is recognized that a full 25 per cent of all 
U.S. exports are shipped within or to subsidiaries of U.S.-owned in-
ternational corporations."45 Confirming this phenomenon is the re-
cent announcement by the EEC that in 1968 the sales of United 
States manufacturing subsidiaries operating within the European 
Common Market were almost four times the value of American ex-
ports of manufacturing products to the EEC and two and one-half 
times greater than total American exports to the EEC.46 Despite 
some indications in 1968 that American direct investment in Europe 
was declining due to overcapacity,47 statistics reveal that direct in-
vestment abroad by MNEs based in the United States continues to 
increase at an annual rate of ten per cent.48 
A very significant recent development has been the increase of 
European and Japanese direct investment abroad.49 The value of 
foreign direct investment in the United States has risen by more than 
one half in just five years, from 8.8 billion dollars at the end of 1965 
to an estimated 13.2 billion dollars at the end of 1970.150 Since 1967, 
42. Polk, supra note 12, at 8. Professor Sidney Rolfe observed: "This 2:1 ratio is 
a rule-of-thumb estimate but probably a pretty good one. Based on 1967 data, output 
in the vicinity of $120 billion per annum resulted from U.S. direct investment of some 
$60 billion." Rolfe, supra note 6, at 6. By way of comparison, the United States export 
figure for 1967 was only 30 billion dollars. On the basis of Polk's more recent estimate, 
the ratio appears to be even higher than 2:1. See text accompanying note 10 supra. 
43. S. Rolfe &: W. Damm, supra note I, at 107. See Krause, Why Exports Are Be• 
coming Irrelevant, 9 ATLANTIC COMMUNITY Q. 337 (1971), Krause expresses his view 
that the United States is passing out of the industrial age and becoming a service 
economy in which exports will become increasingly irrelevant. 
44. Polk, supra note 12, at 8. 
45. Rolfe, supra note 6, at 6. See text accompanying note 21 supra. 
46. The sales of subsidiaries grew from 4.8 billion dollars in 1961 to 12 billion dol-
lars in 1967, and to 14 billion dollars in 1968. EEC Information Service, Press Release, 
June 21, 1972, [New Developments] 2 CCH COMM. Mrcr. REP. ,i 9510, at 9129 (1972). 
47. The Rush to Europe Slows to a Crawl, BusINESS WEEK, Aug. 3, 1968, at 82; 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, April 14, 1969. 
48. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 907 (Testimony of Stephen Hymer, Asso-
ciate Professor of Economics, Yale University). 
_ .. 49. See Rhodes, The 4merican <;hal]_enge {Jhalle,:,ged, 47 ~y. Aus. REY., Sept.-
Oct. 1969, at 45; Rolfe, Updating Adam Smith, INTERPLAY, Nov. 1968, at 15, 17. 
50. SUI.WEY, supra note 36, Sept. 1967, at 518, Oct. 1971, at 38. In 1970 the value of 
foreign direct investment in the United States rose 1.4 billion dollars, following a rise 
of 1 billion dollars in 1969. A substantial portion was related to new acquisitions or 
increases in equity investments in a small number of United States corporations, id., 
Oct. 1971, at 36. See also Responding to Le Dt!fi Americain, FINANCE, Jan. 1971, at 30; 
Tracy, A Big Foreign Stake in U.S. Industry (A Portfolio), FORTUNE, Aug. 1971, at 118. 
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the direct investment of European companies in the United States 
has for the first time increased at a greater rate than the direct invest-
ment of American-based corporations in Europe. 51 
The number of MNEs in the world varies according to the de-
finition of the term employed. According to a recent estimate, there 
were about 200 American-based MNEs and fifty based in other coun-
tries in the manufacturing and extractive industries in 1969.62 Since 
the trend is toward larger and additional !vINEs, "the free world faces 
a substantial shift in the ownership and control of industry from 
local nationals to foreigners."53 Thus, in addition to economic con-
sequences, this shift has an important political dimension: "Foreign 
control means the potential shift outside the country of the locus of 
some types of decision-making."54 Europeans, for example, are em-
phasizing the need for political power, not to prevent the American-
based MNEs from coming since they admit that the MNEs are bene-
ficial, but rather as a means of exercising some form of control. 55 
51. Hellmann, The Challenge to U.S. Dominance of the International Corporation, 
9 ATLANTIC CoMMUNITY Q. 76 (1971). France increased her world direct investment by 
approximately 300 per cent in the five years between 1962 and 1967, so that French 
investments abroad now equal foreign investments in France. A similar trend is 
shown by German and Swedish direct foreign investments. See Rolfe, supra note 6, at 
9-12. German direct investment abroad increased from less than 1 billion dollars in 
1961 to 3.6 billion dollars in 1968, Runderlass Aussenwirtschaft, No. 14:/69 (German 
Dept. of Commerce, Bonn). British direct investment abroad tripled between 1961 
and 1967, increasing from 1.3 billion dollars in 1961 to 3.8 billion dollars in 1967, and 
then to an estimated 4.9 billion dollars in 1968. (Statistics compiled by author from 
various issues of BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL.) Japanese annual direct investment abroad 
increased from 92.4 million dollars in 1960 to 224 million dollars in 1967, with a 
total of 1.4 billion by March 31, 1968, JAPANESE WHITE PAPER ON EcONO.MIC COOPERA· 
TION, quoted in Iwasa, Japan Ventures into Southeast Asia, 4 CowM. J. WORLD Bus. 
49, 51 (1969). The table below, compiled by the author from various issues of SURVEY, 
supra note 36, shows foreign investment in millions of dollars in the United States in 
recent years, employing the same assumptions as in note 41 supra. 
1963 1968 1969 1970b 
Total 7,934 10,815 11,818 13,209 
'\V'estern Europe 5,481 7,750 8,510 9,515 
EEC 1,728 2,790 3,306 3.,528 
Britain 2,265 3,409 3,496 4,110 
Others 1,488 1.,551 1,708 1,877 
Canada 2,183 2,659 2,834 3,112 
Latin America 112 182 193 228 
Japan 181 176 233 
Others 158• 43 105 121 
a Japan is included in the "Others" category in 1963. 
b The figures for 1970 are preliminary. 
52. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 1, at 10. See text accompanying notes 57-66 infra for 
a business definition of the MNE and text accompanying notes 146-60 infra for a 
legal definition. 
53. J. BEHR!IIAN, supra note 1 at 10. 
54. W'ATKINS REPORT, supra note 3, at 27. 
55. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 943 (Testimony of J.-J. Servan-Schreiber). 
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The conclusion is irresistible that all industrialized countries are 
· sharing in the newly developing world economy, and, despite the 
post-World War II American era, there is no longer an American 
monopoly of MNEs. As one observer noted, "If European firms be-
come more multinational, and if Americans continue to invest 
abroad, we will create a large number of North Atlantic corporations 
no longer tied specifically to any particular nation."56 
C. A Business Definition of the Multinational Enterprise 
Not every large enterprise that engages in transnational business 
is truly "multinational." The term "multinational enterprise" and 
its business cognates do not refer to a narrowly defined business 
organization. Generally, the popular reference is to any big business 
with large across-the-border operations. Those analysts who have at-
tempted more precise definitions encounter substantial difficulties, 
often resulting from conceptual misunderstandings or incomplete 
data.57 As one authority has pointed out: 
Multinational enterprises were born to utilize with ever increasing 
efficiency resources such as raw materials, capital, management and 
research. But how many of these corporations can rightly be called 
"multinational," and how many are instead merely large enterprises, 
which limit themselves to operation on various markets?58 
Since a precise, accepted definition of an MNE does not exist, it 
is necessary instead to enumerate the main factors that characterize 
such firms and hope thereby broadly to delimit it. 
The major identifying criterion of the MNE is the implementa-
tion of a global strategy involving all the units of the enterprise and 
directed by a single top management. 59 This leads in turn to two 
distinctive features of an MNE. First, it transacts a sufficiently sub-
stantial amount of business abroad so that its financial status is de-
pendent upon operations in several countries. Objective indications 
of an MNE include the proportion of assets, sales, production, and 
emplo~ent outside of the home country, 60 foreign affiliates, and 
56. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 906 (Testimony of Stephen Hymer). 
57. See Roback &: Simmonds, supra note 13, at 6. 
58. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 759 (Testimony of Guido Colonna di Paliano, 
Director, Fiat Corporation, and former Italian member of the EEC Commission). 
59. "The best criteria would seem to be the horizons and strategy of the company 
rather than the share of assets or sales outside of the home country." Roback 8c Sim-
monds, supra note 13, at 10. 
60. Such criteria are "biased by the size of the home-country economy and market," 
and therefore are not fully meaningful. Roback 8c Simmonds, supra note 13, at IO. 
Thus, a company based in a small country would tend to have a larger portion of its 
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distribution of equity by nationality.61 Second, "its management 
makes decisions on the basis of multinational alternatives."62 The 
subjective attitude of company executives must be evaluated in esti-
mating the degree of "multinationality" of a firm. MNEs attempt to 
coordinate production and sales on a global basis, relying on foreign 
plants as alternative sources of supply and transferring components 
between the foreign affiliates and parent companies.68 The Ford 
Motor Company declares: "It is our goal to be in every single country 
there is. Iron Curtain countries, Russia, China. We at Ford Motor 
Co. look at a world map without any boundaries."64 Unilever states: 
"We want to Unileverize our Indians and Indianize our Uni-
leverans."65 A global orientation of the management toward the main 
problems and issues of the enterprise is a vital characteristic of an 
MNE.<i0 
D. Are Multinational Enterprises Really "Multinational"? 
Some commentators have attempted to classify firms according to 
their degree of multinationality. The Canadian Watkins Report 
employs three terms to describe degrees of multinationality.<i7 First, 
there is the "national firm," with relatively small foreign operations 
and "citizenship" in the home country alone. Second, there is the 
"multinational corporation," which "seeks to be a good citizen of 
assets or sales outside of the country than a company in a larger country. Id. In addi-
tion, direct foreign investment data generally measure investments external to the 
home country whereas, in a true MNE, account should be taken of the investment at 
home as well as investment abroad. Id. 
61. A study of the MNE by the Harvard Graduate School of Business chose cor-
porations listed in FORTUNE magazine's "500 Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations" that 
own twenty-five per cent or more of the equity interest in manufacturing subsidiaries 
in six or more foreign countries. See generally J. VAUPEL&: J. CURHAN, supra note 41, 
at 2-3; Fouraker &: Stopford, Organizational Structure and the Multinational Strategy, 
13 AnMINISIRATIVE SCIENCE Q. 47, 57 (1968) [hereinafter Fouraker&: Stopford]. 
62. Steiner, The Nature and Significance of Multinational Corporate Planning, in 
MULTINATIONAL CoRPORATE PLANNING I, 6 (G. Steiner &: w. Cannon ed. 1966) [herein-
after G. Steiner &: W. Cannon]. 
63. A Rougher Road for Multinationals, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 19, 1970, at 58 [herein-
after BUSINESS WEEK]. For instance, "IBM Corp. links its laboratories in the U.S. and 
abroad with a data transmission network for continuous exchange of research findings. 
[Likewise] Ford builds Pinto engines in the United Kingdom and Germany for as-
sembly into cars in the United States and Canada." Id. 
64. Id. at 58, quoting Robert Stevenson, Executive Vice-President, Ford Motor Co. 
65. Perlmutter, The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, 4 CoLUM. 
J. WoRLD Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1969, at 9, 11 [hereinafter Perlmutter], quoting the Chairman 
of the Board of Directors of Unilever. 
66. Id. at 9. While a recognition of these subjective elements is helpful in ex-
plaining the behavior of MNEs, it obviously cannot serve as a workable definition for 
an initial classification of firms as MNEs. 
67. WATKINS REPoRT, supra note 3, at 33. 
744 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:729 
each country in which it is operating"68 and is sensitive to local tra-
ditions and policies.69 Third, there is the "international or global 
corporation," which owes primary loyalty to no single country and 
makes decisions solely on the basis of corporate efficiency.70 As might 
be expected from the kinds of distinctions sought to be made, there 
are no clear-cut lines separating these three classifications.71 
Although "time, transnational mergers, management selection on 
a geocentric basis, and further financial crossovers"72 are likely to 
increase the multinationality of even the "national firm," most 
MNEs are still identified with their country of origin and thus are 
not yet fully multinational.78 Only a few European MNEs have made 
strides toward complete multinationalization. Two early Anglo-Dutch 
examples are Royal Dutch-Shell and Unilever. More recently, the 
tie-up between Britain's Dunlop and Italy's Pirelli is a step toward 
full multinationalization,74 as was the Agfa-Gevaert link-up in 1964 
combining Belgian and German photographic production and mar-
keting facilities, which previously had been separately owned and 
operated,75 resulting in an MNE not identified with a single country. 
68. C, K!NDLEBERGER, supra note 1, at 180. Professor Kindleberger accepts the 
terminology of the Watkins Report in his study. 
69. WATKINS REPORT, supra note 3, at 33. 
70. Professor Perlmutter used very similar criteria, dividing the firms into (1) 
"ethnocentric or home-country oriented,'' a firm that is associated with the nationality 
of the headquarters; (2) "polycentric or host-country oriented,'' a firm with foreign 
subsidiaries that are associated with the local nationality; and (3) "geo-centric or 
world oriented,'' a firm that is not identified with any nationality. Perlmutter, supra 
note 65, at 11. 
71. See Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 13; Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay, 
47 FOREIGN .AFF~ 110, 114 (1968). For the problem of defining the MNE, see also 
R, ~:LOUGH, INTERNATIONAi, BUSINESS: ENVIRONMENT AND ADAl'TATION 8 (1966); E. KOLDE, 
supra note 25, at 218; s. ROLFE, THE lNTERNATIONAI, CORPORATION 8-16 (Study for the 
22d Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce, Istanbul 1969) [hereinafter 
S. RoUEJ; Union o( International Associations, Multinational Business Enterprise, 
in YEARBOO~ ON INTERNATIONAI, ORGANIZATIONS, 1968-1969; Angelo, supra note 2, at 
469-79; Fatouros, supra note 2, at 326-31. 
72. Rolfe, supra note 6, at 17. 
73. "Multinational corporations have an address and a nationality, rhetoric and 
intentions notwithstanding, and what we should be talking about here are American 
corporations operating abroad •••• " MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 911 (Statement 
qf Melville Watkins). 
74. This tie-up has faced major problems because of the continuing losses incurred 
by Pirelli. [Euromarket News] CCH Co~. MKT. REPORTS, No. 199, at 7 (Nov. 7, 
1972). 
75. !jee Le Page, The Europea71 Merger-Agfa,Gevaert, in lm>uSTIUAL INTEGRATION 
IN EUROPE, PRACI"ICE AND P0UCY 9 (Conference sponsored by the federal Trust for 
Education and Research, March 1968). A direct merger in the legal sense is impossible 
under various European laws and would involve tremendous tax consequences even 
where permissible. Therefore, firms endeavor to create a transnational merger in the 
economic sense, while preserving legal separation. See notes 172-74 infra and ac-
companying text. 
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In a true MNE, the personnel should be interchangeable between 
the parent and the affiliate corporations, yet in most present day 
MNEs top management is composed of home-country managers.76 
Developing MNEs have moved further toward utilizing multinational 
strategies in the areas of financial and product planning than in per-
sonnel policies.77 So far, MNEs have been hesitant to promote local 
managers to positions at corporate headquarters,78 but there is reason 
to believe that, with growing maturity, MNEs will develop multi-
national personnel policies. The addition of managers from abroad 
has given a multinational appearance to the high-level management 
of several major MNEs.79 This trend will continue as MNEs adopt 
policies aimed at attracting capable management on a global basis.80 
An enterprise that is truly multinational must be multinational 
in ownership as well; yet, as in the personnel area, this goal has not 
generally been reached. Several MNEs have increased the multina-
tionalization of their sources of funds. Some MNEs have long used 
the stock markets in many countries, such as Shell, which is widely 
owned in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
and France.81 Financial "crossovers" through the foreign buying of 
American corporate shares have also been increasing recently.82 
General Motors believes that operation through worldwide wholly 
owned subsidiaries "facilitates unity, coordinated policy determina-
tion and sound operating procedures."83 Therefore, GM encourages 
residents of host countries to buy the parent company stock on the 
same basis as it is made available to the people of the United States, 
without regard to the nationality of the shareholder. 84 Most large 
MNEs follow a similar policy,85 and it is anticipated that the listing 
76. See Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 12. 
77. Rose, The Rewarding Strategies of Multinationalism, FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1968, 
at 180 [hereinafter Rose]. 
78. Id. 
79. BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 68, at 58. For instance, the President of IBM World 
Trade Corporation is a Frenchman. Likewise, the number two man and finance com-
mittee chairman at Black &: Decker is an Englishman. As another recent example, 
Motorola announced the promotion of the manager of its Israeli affiliate to its inter-
national headquarters. 
80. BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 63, at 58-59. 
81. See S. ROLFE, supra note 71, at 107. 
82. The ownership of securities of United States corporations by foreigners in-
creased from 8 billion dollars in 1950 to 15 billion dollars in 1967, over IO billion 
dollars of which is owned by Europeans. S. RoLFE, supra note 71, at 118. 
88, F. DONNER, THE WORLD-WIDE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 106 (1967). 
84. However, GM admits there are many obstacles raised by the world legal environ-
ment. Id. at 98-102. 
85. See S. RoLFE, supra note 71, at 114-15. 
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of the parent's stock on foreign stock exchanges will continue to 
increase.86 Furthermore, as a result of the capital-flow restrictions 
imposed by certain countries such as the United States87 and the 
United Kingdom, the Euro-bond market, an unplanned and un-
regulated international capital market, has developed and has at-
tracted corporate borrowers from both Europe and Japan.88 Other 
innovations of international financial sources have followed, includ-
ing the development of Euro-commercial paper.89 
While it is perhaps true that "[t]he aim of the multinational com-
pany is, quite forthrightly to become more completely multinational 
in terms of its people, its capital, and ownership,"00 it is clear that 
most MNEs have not yet reached a stage even approaching complete 
multinationality. 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL AND CONTROL STRUCTURE 
A. Organization of the Multinational Enterprise 
The main objective in the organization of an MNE is to 
maximize managerial efficiency. The organizational structure adopted 
should enable top management to exercise the desired degree of 
control over the various national entities and divisions of the enter-
prise. 
A firm progresses through a series of organizational stages of 
multinationalization in its evolution into an MNE.01 Most manu-
facturing firms, for example, start by exporting their products abroad. 
To accommodate this new dimension of operations, the domestic 
86. Vernon, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty, 45 HAR.v. Bus. R.Ev., 
March-April 1967, at 156, 166 [hereinafter Vernon]. 
87. The United States program, which was formerly voluntary, became mandatory 
by Executive Order on Jan. I, 1968, see note 37 supra, and is controlled by the Com• 
merce Department's Office of Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI). 
88. S. ROI.FE, supra note 71, at 113. 
89. See, e.g., Ullman, Euro-Commercial Paper and Its Legal Problems, WoRLDWIDE P 
& I PLANNING, Jan.-Feb. 1971, at 22. See note 38 supra for a discussion of the Euro-dollar 
and Asia-dollar markets. 
90. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 763 (Statement of James W. McKee, Jr.). 
91. See generally M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, THE STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE 26-63 (1970) [hereinafter M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS]; BUSINESS lNTERNA• 
TIONAL CORPORATION, ORGANIZING THE WORLDWIDE CORPORATION (1970) [hereinafter 
BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL]; E. KOLDE, supra note 25, at 245-58; STIEGLITZ, ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTIJRES OF INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES (1965); D. ZENOFF, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MANAGEMENT 259-65 (1971) [hereinafter D. ZENOFF]; Clee & Sachtjen, Organizing a 
World-Wide Business, 42 HARv. Bus. R.Ev., Nov.-Dec. 1964, at 55 [hereinafter Clee &: 
Sachtjen]; Fouraker & Stopford, supra note 61; Hawrylyshyn, supra note 27, at 81; 
BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 63, at 64; Rose, supra note 77, at 103. 
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organizational structure includes an export department; the firm 
may be described as "foreign oriented"-type A.92 
As the volume of sales abroad increases, the export department is 
no longer capable of handling international sales. Distribution opera-
tions and limited manufacturing operations are established abroad, 
thereby increasing the degree of multinationalization. To replace the 
export department, an international division or an international 
headquarters company is established to control all foreign opera-
tions; this may be termed the type B firm.93 The international divi-
sion is therefore "an independent profit center" on an equal basis 
with the domestic product division.94 
As the volume of business abroad continues to increase, a broader 
range of manufacturing operations is undertaken abroad. Often the 
firm sets up research and development facilities in foreign countries, 
To avoid conflicts between the profit responsibility of the inter-
national operations and the global management of the enterprise,95 
some MNEs have adopted "a product-oriented organization, [placing] 
executives in charge of product divisions on a world-wide basis."96 
This may be termed the type C enterprise. Foreign and domestic 
operations are carried on the same set of books in the product divi-
sion, and sales opportunities are sought on a global basis-subject 
only to the restrictions imposed by the sovereign nations involved. 
Thus, under the type C structure, the MNE has much greater co-
ordination between its domestic product divisions and its foreign 
marketing operations.07 
The type C enterprise may choose a different organizational struc-
ture. Instead of product divisions, the company may divide the 
former international division into marketing-oriented geographical 
divisions;98 senior executives are then assigned various areas of the 
world, domestic as well as foreign, while a worldwide top manage-
92. See E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 244. 
93. Hawrylyshyn, supra note 27, at 81. See D. ZENOFF, supra note 91, at 262, for a 
diagram of the international division structure of a type B company. 
94. Rose, supra note 77, at 103. 
95. For instance, top management might find it difficult to make global price ad-
justments on intercompany transactions. See text accompanying notes 301-14 infra for 
a discussion of intercompany transactions. 
96. Hawrylyshyn, supra note 27, at 81. 
97. See, e.g., BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 63, at 140 (discussion of the reorganization 
of Rockwell Manufacturing Co.); text accompanying notes 137-45 infra (discussion of 
Sperry Rand). See also R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 125-40. 
98. See Clee 8e Sachtjen, supra note 91, at 60-62. 
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ment oversees the geographical divisions.99 Some MNEs establish a 
functional type C organization, in which financial and marketing ex-
ecutives exercise global responsibilities.100 Other MNEs set up a 
hybrid structure of worldwide product divisions within geographi-
cal areas, especially when consumer products are involved;101 indeed, 
some enterprises even retain the international division or interna-
tional corporation.102 By carefully structuring its organizational 
format and by adopting worldwide approaches,103 the MNE can avoid 
conflicts between the domestic product divisions and the interna-
tional divisions. 
Operations abroad may be conducted through either a foreign 
subsidiary or a branch. While a multitude of variables, both cor-
porate and legal, determines in a particular instance whether a com-
pany will choose the subsidiary or branch form, identifiable trends 
have emerged in particular industries. Most marketing-oriented 
American-based MNEs operate abroad through subsidiaries and 
affiliates, while many service corporations (particularly banks and 
advertising agencies) and firms in extractive industries operate 
through branches.104 The majority of American affiliates abroad have 
been wholly owned by the parent corporation or other affiliates of 
the same MNE.105 Occasionally, a regional center is established be-
tween the foreign subsidiary and the parent company. The regional 
center facilitates coordination of the activities of local corporations 
in a group of countries. The center is regarded as an extension of the 
headquarters that has moved closer to the foreign operations.106 
While this coordination is particularly necessary in marketing opera-
tions, leading some firms to rely entirely on regional marketing 
centers, regional centers have also been used to facilitate financial 
coordination107 or to take advantage of favorable tax treatment in 
"tax haven" countries.108 
99. Id. at 61. 
100. D. ZENOFF, supra note 91, at 262. 
101. See Clee &: Sachtjen, supra note 91, at 62. 
102. See E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 252, for a diagram of the functional type C 
organizational structure; D. ZENoFF, supra note 91, at 263-64, for diagrams of product• 
oriented type C structure and the geographically decentralized type C structure. 
103. See Fouraker &: Stopford, supra note 61. 
104. D. ZENoFF, supra note 91, at 190. 
105. Id. 
106. M. BROOKE &: H. REMMERS, supra note 91, at 43-44. 
107. Id. at 45. 
108. But see text accompanying notes 168-71 infra. 
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B. Control Within the Multinational Enterprise 
One of the major problems faced by the developing MNE is the 
necessity of allocating control over foreign operations. In general 
terms, MNEs tend to centralize control of basic strategies in order to 
operate in the most efficient manner and to exploit opportunities on 
a worldwide basis; such coordination is vital because their multiple 
affiliates operate in potentially overlapping markets. The MNE can 
organize the interchange of products and components on a multina-
tional basis. For example, through its affiliates Massey-Ferguson com-
bines "a French-made transmission, a British-made engine, and a 
Mexican-made axle constructed with American-made sheet metal 
parts to produce a tractor in Detroit that will be sold in Canada."109 
MNEs are quite distinct from solely domestic enterprises in the 
sophistication of control necessary to operate efficiently. 
Even the strategy utilized to achieve comprehensive control must 
be multidimensional. Authority over decisions in the diverse areas of 
marketing, finance, and production must be allocated not only be-
nveen various levels of management, but also among the available-
locations on any given level. In the true MNE, management appre-
ciates that strategic choices between domestic and foreign markets 
are closely interrelated.11° 
The control dimension of the MNE distinguishes it from the 
domestic firm. A subsidiary of an MNE in a foreign country does not 
necessarily behave in the same way as its "competitor," a domestic 
firm in the host country operating under the same market conditions. 
They may operate differently and still be rational in their efforts to 
maximize profits. The domestic corporation is by definition national, 
usually smaller, and maximizes income on a short-term basis in the 
domestic market context, whereas the MNE operates in a world en-
vironment and maximizes profits on a long-term basis.111 
The separation of control from the situs of the subsidiaries or 
affiliates raises some difficult political as well as business and legal 
problems for the MNE. Political disputes occur when governments 
attempt to implement national economic policies through MNEs 
based within their jurisdiction, while countries in which the sub-
sidiaries and affiliates of the MNE are operating resist those policies. 
Thus, it is difficult to reconcile an asserted right of the home coun-
109. Rose, supra note 77, at 104. 
110. See, e.g., Weisglas &: Coope, Planning in Unilever with Special Reference to 
the Common Market, in G. Steiner &: "\V. Cannon, supra note 62, at 223. 
111. C. KlNDLEBERCER, supra note I, at 5. 
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try to require the parent company to direct its global subsidiaries 
to act in accordance with national policies, with the similar right of 
the host country to require that subsidiaries operating within its 
jurisdiction obey its own divergent policies. At the same time, the 
host country may even attempt to regulate the operations of the 
parent company in the home country. This leads to inevitable fric-
tion between nations, with the MNE as the potential victim of the 
conflict. This conflict is illustrated by the various criteria that nations 
use to define their jurisdiction over MNEs in determining the nation-
ality, domicile, or residence of enterprises for a range of legal pur-
poses including conflicts of laws, taxation, antitrust laws, balance of 
payments regulation, and export controls.112 
Ascertaining the location of control for legal and business pur-
poses is very difficult and is not subject to rigid rules. The location 
of operating control varies significantly from one MNE to the next, 
and is largely dependent on the strategy of control selected. Interest-
ingly, a case can be made for both general control theories: centraliza-
tion of decision-making at the headquarters level, and decentraliza-
tion of control at the subsidiary or affiliate level. 
The greater proximity of a foreign subsidiary to product markets 
argues persuasively for delegation of tactical decision-making from 
the parent corporation to the subsidiary. This increased sensitivity to 
local conditions makes the subsidiary the logical locus for marketing 
decisions and strategic planning.113 As a general proposition, market-
ing-oriented firms have a more decentralized control structure. Yet, 
even in those firms there are certain areas in which a coordinated and 
centralized managerial control system may be compelled. Thus, close 
supervision by the parent is generally found over aggregate produc-
tion plans, tax and antitrust strategy, and relations between the 
MNE and the host governments.114 Still other firms may centralize 
on a broader basis, particularly those with a technical orientation,m 
and, when most of the relevant knowledge, skill, or resources are at 
company headquarters, there is a tendency to centralize.116 One MNE, 
"which sees itself as being at once centralized and decentralized, feels 
that it operates in three dimensions: a global dimension of central 
policy making, strategy and research; a continental dimension of 
m_anufacturing and management development; and a national dimen-
112. See text accompanying notes 315-29 (tax), 348-68 (antitrust) infra. 
113. See R. ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 156 (1967). 
114. Id. 
115. See BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 5. 
116. Id. at 42-47. 
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sion of marketing, treasury, and personnel."117 Some enterprises dele-
gate authority to a regional center. The regional center, when one 
exists at all, can be used as a "post office for messages in transit or as 
an important decision-making unit."118 
It is difficult to conclude that control generally is being either 
centralized or decentralized. Not long ago, decentralization seemed 
to be prevailing in international business, but at a later stage there 
were indications of a shift to a greater degree of centralization.119 
Centralization permits more definitive and pervasive policies for 
long-range planning in terms of international markets.120 Develop-
ments such as "worldwide and regional economic integration, increas-
ing competition on a multinational basis, [ and] ... the rapid devel-
opment of faster communication systems and transportation media" 
have provided further incentive to centralize.121 Just recently, how-
ever, signs of decentralization have again appeared as the size of for-
eign interests and operations of firms has continued to grow, thereby 
making centralization less manageable and efficient.122 Thus, much 
decision-making authority has been delegated back to the foreign 
subsidiaries or regional headquarters.123 
If any generalization about the forms and trends of control in 
MNEs is possible, it is only that the location of control must be 
ascertained on a case-by-case basis. Governments desiring to control 
the business operations of MNEs must direct their legal commands to 
that component of the MNE that is empowered to respond-the 
place where the effective control lies with respect to the particular 
issue under consideration. Nations must look at the entire corporate 
network of the :rvfNE in order to determine where the particular 
authority resides, and they must consider whether addressing direc-
tives to local affiliates will achieve the desired policy objectives. 
117. Id. at 5. 
118. M. BROOKE &: H. REMMERS, supra note 91, at 125. 
As a firm's international operations expand and become a more significant deter-
minant of its financial status, enterprises begin to recognize the need for a high quality 
communications system. Yet, the communications system designed may vary according 
to the purpose sought to be achieved. When communication is desired for decision-
making purposes, it is, of course, necessary to assure that the communications channels 
mirror the established organizational decision-making chain. But when, by contrast, 
the communications system is established for informational purposes only, it need 
not track the organizational system precisely. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, 
at 5. 
119. Id. at 68. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 132. 
123. Id. 
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National policies may well be frustrated if states treat a local affiliate 
of an MNE as a wholly independent entity without regard to the 
actual location of authority and control over the particular subject 
matter sought to be regulated.124 
C. Illustrations of Organizational and Control Structure 
of Multinational Enterprises 
The utilization of these organizational and control techniques 
can be illustrated by examination of two MNEs that have adopted 
widely divergent systems of operation: IBM World Trade Corpora-
tion and Sperry Rand.125 
Despite the fact that the international company or departmental 
structure is generally employed by a type B firm,126 many MNEs con-
tinue to use it. A leading example is IBM, which operates abroad 
through its IBM World Trade Corporation (World Trade), a wholly 
owned domestic subsidiary.127 World Trade maintains controlled 
decentralization of responsibility on a regional basis.128 
The control structure of World Trade clearly documents the 
general control patterns discussed above.129 Marketing operations 
are decentralized in order to maximize sensitivity to local customer 
demands. But, because World Trade's technology is quite advanced 
and rapidly changing, product development and research are co-
ordinated globally, thereby establishing a link not only between the 
subsidiaries within World Trade, but also maintaining operating ties 
between the domestic parent and the foreign operations.130 
World Trade's line structure is geographical.131 Foreign business 
in 106 countries is divided among four areas, two of which are fur-
124. The EEC Court of Justice adopted this approach in its recent Dyestuff deci-
sions. See text accompanying notes 354-68 infra. 
125. The discussion of the structure of IBM and Sperry Rand is based on BUSINESS 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 13-17, 26-28. 
126. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra. 
127. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 12-13. 
128. Id. 
129. See text accompanying notes 113-17 supra. 
130. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 14: 
[P]roduct development and manufacturing are centrally assigned to various 
specialized development laboratories and plants throughout the world. Under 
this system each development laboratory is highly specialized in a particular 
technology and each plant manufactures a specific range of products for the local 
market and for export. This creates an interdependence among foreign and 
domestic plants. 
The laboratories and plants are owned by the company operating in the country in 
which they are located, and they report to that company. 
131. Id. at 15, 17. 
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ther divided into two regions.182 The top officers of the areas are re-
sponsible to the president of World Trade.183 Within a given area, 
management is further subdivided on a geographical basis.134 World 
Trade "has delegated major operational responsibility to the country 
level."185 Many decisions, principally in the areas of "financing re-
quests, external government contracts, engineering and manufactur-
ing coordination, ... and final approval of plans and budgets"186 are 
made by country managers. 
Sperry Rand presents an interesting contrast to the organizational 
and control structure of IBM and World Trade. Instead of maintain-
ing a separate international division, Sperry Rand has elected to 
structure the company into internationally oriented product divi-
sions.187 "Some of the product divisions have their own international 
departments; others operate in turn as worldwide corporations."188 
Thus, the product divisions exercise responsibility over both domes-
tic and foreign operations, facilitating coordinated global strategy.189 
Despite the degree of decentralization inherent in the product 
division structure, Sperry Rand is able to maintain channels of com-
munication that "cut across product lines."140 The "umbrella com-
pany," a device that "join[s] all Sperry affiliates in a single country 
under a single legal framework,"141 is utilized to exercise control at 
the international level. The umbrella company "channels communi-
cations among the product divisions within the country [ and] . . . 
presents a unified corporate image of Sperry Rand to the public."142 
However, actual line responsibility is not exercised by the umbrella 
company but is transmitted between the product division in the 
foreign country and the parent product division headquarters in the 
United States.148 Over 100 foreign companies have been associated 
under the umbrella format.144 In addition, further control is main-
132. Id. at 17. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 27. 
138. Id. 
139. See id. at 19 for a list of characteristics of the MNE, many of which are partic-
ularly applicable to Sperry Rand. 
140. Id. at 27. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
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tained through regional offices that coordinate "companies of a single 
product division within a specific region."145 
Thus, two major MNEs have adopted widely differing organi-
zational and control structures in order to manage effectively in-
ternational operations. Their experiences indicate the range of alter-
native strategies available to an emerging multinational enterprise. 
IV. THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE FROM A 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. A Legal Definition 
The law relating to international corporate investments remains 
undeveloped despite the dramatic rise of MNEs since World War II. 
The lack of a definitive international business law, despite large-scale 
international economic transactions, has not gone unnoticed.146 Thus, 
while the character of business has become multinational, the essence 
of corporate law remains national. This incongruity creates problems 
for company management and other interested groups, including the 
investing public, organized labor, the general public, and regulating 
nations. 
There is no generally accepted legal definition of the MNE. The 
typical MNE is a cluster of separate legal entities in several jurisdic-
tions, which exist only if the laws of each jurisdiction recognize 
them as legal entities. The MNE is a business and economic creature, 
and the usage of that term is presently found only in those fields. The 
lack of a precise legal definition results in the use of a multiplicity of 
inconsistent and confusing terms to describe these business opera-
tions. Even the use of the term "multinational" is not standard and 
exclusive. Terms such as "plurinational," "transnational," "inter-
national," "supranational," "global," "world," and others are used 
in this context, often interchangeably. The term "enterprise" does 
not have a precise legal connotation and is used interchangeably with 
other more common terms of business organization such as "cor-
poration," "company," "firm," "body corporate," "corporate com-
bine," or "corporate enterprise." 
The term "multinational enterprise," convenient as a descriptive 
business term, is also preferable as a legal term. MNEs are not 
organized under any kind of international or supranational law; 
therefore, it is not accurate to call them international or suprana-
145. Id. 
146. See, e.g., Timberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns, 95 U. PA. 
L. R.Ev. 575 (1947) [hereinafter Timberg]. 
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tional enterprises.147 MNEs do not derive a legal personality from 
international law, as, for example, from a treaty or act of an inter-
national organization. They are organized under, and governed by, 
each country's national laws. Nor are MNEs organized under an in-
ternational uniform corporation law pursuant to a treaty. Hence, 
these corporations cannot be regarded as international in the sense 
that contracting states have assumed specific obligations concerning 
the treatment and privileges applicable to such enterprises.148 The 
term "multinational corporation," which is widely used in business 
literature, is also misleading since an MNE usually consists of several 
corporations or other forms of business organization. Such a group 
of related corporations, each with its own legal identity, constitutes 
a single economic entity-the "enterprise."149 However, properly 
viewed the MNE is not a single legal entity, but rather a group of 
corporations throughout the world sharing a single underlying eco-
nomic unity. One commentator thus correctly observed that the 
MNE may be referred to as a multinational cluster of corporations 
in several countries, controlled by one headquarters.160 Accord-
147. There is the exception for intergovernmental joint ventures that may be 
recognized as "international corporations" because they are created by treaty. See Note, 
Corporations Formed Pursuant to Treaty, 76 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1431 (1963). However, this 
is not the case with private business enterprises that must organize under national 
laws. See E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAws 437-43 (1971) [herein-
after E. STEIN]. Some examples of the international corporation are the Scandinavian 
Airline System (SAS), Air Africa, the Suez Canal Company, and such international 
institutions as the Bank for International Settlements, the International Finance 
Corporation, and the Central American Air Navigation Services Corporation. An-
other example stems from the Convention Respecting Luxemburg Railways, Between 
Belgium, France and Luxemburg, April 17, 1946, 27 U.N.T.S. 103, which established 
a company to operate Luxemburg Railways. For further examples of such international 
public enterprises and their legal status, see C. FLIGLER, supra note 15. Such "inter-
national corporations" play a relatively minor role in the new world economy. For 
a definition of the international corporation, see Goldman, Les socit!tt!s internationales, 
in CoURS PROFESSE A. L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALE DE PARIS 2 (1961-
1962), cited in Schmitthoff, Multi-National Companies, 1970 J. Bus. L. 177. See also 
Kahn, International Companies, 3 J. WORLD TRADE L. 498 (1969). 
148. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 437-38. 
149. See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 343, 344 (1947), 
for the argument that "where the corporate entity is defective, or otherwise challenged, 
its existence, extent and consequences may be determined by the actual existence and 
extent and operations of the underlying enterprise, which by these very qualities 
acquires an entity of its own, recognized by law." While courts all over the world have 
focused on the underlying enterprise for various limited purposes, such an entity has 
not yet been generally recognized by law. For further discussion of the concept of 
enterprise, see E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 196 (1936) [herein-
after E. LATTY]; Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 
CALIF. L. R.Ev. 12 (1925) [hereinafter Ballantine]; Foley, Incorporation, Multiple In-
corporation and the Conflict of Laws, 42 HARV. L. R.Ev. 516, 528 (1929). See notes 252-89 
infra and accompanying text. 
150. Aharoni, On the Definition of the Multinational Corporation, 11 Q. R.Ev. EcoN. 
8c Bus. 27, 35 (1972) (suggesting that such a multinational cluster must involve corpora-
tions operating in at least five countries). 
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ingly, the term "multinational corporation" is properly reserved for 
reference to the corporation that controls an MNE ( or the multina-
tional cluster).151 
This Article is concerned with the normal forms of international 
investment carried on by private firms. Most MNEs consist of several 
business units in several countries, each one of which is an established 
legal entity.152 Thus, the MNE has been defined as "a business 
organization characterized by (a) business operations in two or more 
countries, (b) a unified top direction, and (c) legally distinct but 
economically dependent business units subject to that unified direc-
tion."153 The various corporations or other legal entities of diverse 
nationalities are joined together by ties of common control and re-
spond to a common management strategy. It is these ties of control 
that distinguish the MNE as a business phenomenon from a group 
of separate firms in different jurisdictions merely engaged in business 
relations with each other. Of course, the extent to which the inter-
national headquarters actually directs the operation of the various 
national companies depends, as has been noted, on the peculiar 
management strategies of the individual enterprise.154 
In a typical MNE, the headquarters is a central parent holding 
company155 that controls the various foreign subsidiaries either 
directly or, more commonly, through a foreign holding company. 
Control is usually assured by ownership of a majority of stock of the 
controlled firms.156 The foreign subsidiaries are established by the 
parent company or formed by acquisition of control of existing com-
panies. MNEs are also formed by combining two or more companies 
from different countries. After merger or reorganization, the former 
firms may or may not be dissolved.157 Whether or not the companies 
are formally combined to form a new legal entity, the actual eco-
nomic result is a single, unified enterprise. 
151. Such terminology is correct from a legal point of view since its relates to a 
single corporation, but because it is frequently used inaccurately in business literature, 
such a controlling corporation will generally be referred to in this Article as the parent 
corporation, to distinguish it from the MNE as a whole. 
152. See Litvak &: Maule, The Multi-national Firm and Conflicting National 
Interests, 3 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 309, 311 (1969), for a diagram of the various business 
relationships that can be created by the MNE. 
153. Timberg, supra note 146, at 577. In fact, the author called the MNE "an 
international combine." Id. 
154. See notes 108-24 supra and accompanying text. 
155. See text accompanying note 165 infra. 
156. This is typical of MNEs based in the United States. In many cases MNEs 
insist on having wholly owned or majority owned subsidiaries, although control can 
be assured, as a practical matter, by ownership of less than a majority of the stock. 
157, Cf. INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 368(a). 
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The MNE resulting from economic integration is not necessarily 
formed by means of stock control. Control can also be obtained by a 
contract between formerly independent companies in which each 
firm becomes obligated to adhere to common business strategies. A 
variety of contract forms are available to accomplish this result.158 
These forms of control are often designed to avoid the legal obstacles 
to mergers across national boundaries that arise from transfer of a 
company's headquarters or principal place of business from one 
country to another.um 
Regardless of which form or legal technique is used to establish 
the enterprise as a single economic entity, it is the interaction be-
tween the transnational control of business groups and national poli-
tical institutions that generates the most significant legal and political 
conflicts involving the MNE. The question raised is in what in-
stances, and to what extent, will nation-states recognize the existence 
of the control ties.160 In other words, when and for what legal pur-
poses do the regulating countries consider the local business opera-
tion as a separate entity, and when do they view it as an integral part 
of a larger enterprise controlled abroad? 
B. The Form of Business Organization 
The precise form of business organization selected for each unit 
of the MNE in the various countries of operation depends on a 
combination of general management planning, the relevant business 
laws of the host country and the home country, and any international 
agreements to which the two countries are signatories. The result is 
that the MNE is comprised of different types of legal entities, which 
generate more than mere differences in terminology. 
I. The Corporation 
Because of the predominant role played by American-based 
MNEs, perhaps the most widely used business form is the corpora-
tion. Corporations range in size from the gigantic firm owned by 
several millions of shareholders to the "close" corporation held by 
one or a few shareholders.161 The existence of the corporate form 
158. This is typical of the European-based MNE, such as Unilever, which is a 
combination of the British Unilever Ltd. and the Dutch Unilever NV. The German 
Agfa and the Dutch Gevaert were integrated through the use of a holding company. 
See text accompanying note 75 supra. See also notes 370-75 infra and accompanying text. 
159. See text accompanying notes 172-74 infra. 
160. See notes 369-94 infra and accompanying text for the recognition of control 
ties by the Konzernrecht, the German Law of Related Companies. 
161. Despite the substantial differences between the closely held corporation and 
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allows an enterprise to organize a series of related corporations 
through which the business of the firm is conducted. Properly used, 
the separation of the enterprise into distinct legal entities enables 
corporations to achieve greater efficiency. It can provide a convenient 
vehicle through which a single group can manage many different 
businesses, particularly when it is desirable to distinguish between 
the manufacturing, marketing-service, and financial divisions of the 
enterprise. Central business strategies may be formulated, provided 
the disadvantages of over-centralization are appreciated.162 The multi-
corporate operation of an enterprise may also be a direct result of 
the parent corporation's expansion through purchase of stock in 
companies in the same field. Thus, "a corporation, control of which 
has been acquired by purchase, may be operated as a subsidiary to 
retain the benefit of its well-advertised corporate name, and good 
will and separate merchandising policies . . . . "163 
The separation of an enterprise into distinct legal entities also 
serves to reduce financial risks. Subsidiaries may be used for risky 
divisions or uncertain business ventures in order to limit liability 
to the property of the subsidiary corporation, thereby immunizing 
the parent and its other subsidiaries from those particular risks.164 
The holding corporation is a device created to serve the needs 
of large business combinations, especially when the individual com-
panies of the enterprise are domiciled in different states or coun-
tries.165 Holding companies may be divided into two basic types. 
There are financial holding companies "which invest in securities 
solely for the purpose of dividend or interest income and capital 
gains, without performing any actual commercial or industrial 
services for affiliated companies."166 Then there are industrial or 
commercial holding companies in which the parent company renders 
the publicly held corporation, in many of the fifty American states both are organized 
under and subject to the same corporation statute. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 100-6804 
(Deering 1962). However, some modem statutes contain provisions specifically governing 
close corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1968 Cum. Supp.); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. 608.70-.77 (1972-1973 Supp.). Statutes in several other states contain provi-
sions that, as a practical matter, are relevant only to close corporations. See, e.g., N.C. 
GEN. STAT, §§ 55-73 (1965). See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr §§ 15, 16(£), 32, 34-37, 
40, 50, 54, 60, 73, 79, 143-45 (1969), for important provisions especially applicable to 
close corporations. 
162. See L. GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAw 195 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter L. GOWER]. 
163. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 168 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter H. BALLANTINE]. 
164. Id. 
165. 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2821 
(Perm. Ed. 1963) [hereinafter W. FLETCHER]. 
166. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO CoMPANY 
FORMATION 37 (no. 263, 1970) [hereinafter ICC 263]. 
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services on a permanent basis and interacts with affiliated companies 
within the MNE, primarily for purposes of expansion.167 Due to 
the advantages of the holding company over a consolidation, pur-
chase, or lease, many holding companies have been formed for the 
purpose of controlling other companies.168 
Although the holding company developed in the context of the 
American federal system, the principle is of great utility in the inter-
national context. The MNE can use one or more of its companies 
(usually in the form of an intermediate holding company) as a profit 
center to facilitate reinvestment of earnings abroad. Expansion of 
subsidiary operations is particularly encouraged when such earnings 
enjoy tax deferrals in the home country until actual remittance, 
so that earnings of foreign subsidiaries are taxed by the home country 
only if and when they are distributed to the parent company in that 
country. However, this possibility, as applied to American-based 
MNEs, is restricted by the Revenue Act of 1962,169 and similar limita-
tions are currently in effect or contemplated by a few other indus-
trialized countries, notably Canada-where it has been adopted but 
is not yet effective170-and Germany-where it has been passed by 
the Bundestag (Parliament) but is awaiting action by the Bundesrat 
(Council of State).171 There are, however, differences in the scope of 
these laws. 
The corporate form in general, and the holding company form 
in particular, can assist the MNE in mitigating the effect of restrictive 
laws of undeveloped nations and the conflicts in legal requirements 
among the various sovereignties involved. In a regional market, such 
167. Id. 
168. 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 2821. The holding company form can be 
used to integrate numerous operating corporations as a means of facilitating the sale 
of securities or utilizing service contracts with subsidiaries. Control may be maintained 
through a pyramid structure with a holding company at the top controlling inter-
mediate holding and operating subsidiaries, which in tum control operating subsid-
iaries at the base. Such a structure can result in maximum control with minimum 
investment. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 163, § 168. See A. BERLE &: G. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-75 (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter A. BERLE 
& G. MEANS] for a discussion of "pyramiding." 
The holding company is only one of many structural forms available to control 
large businesses. The "megasubsidiary," a massive wholly owned subsidiary corpora-
tion, has developed only recently, but already occupies an important position in busi-
ness. See Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate 
Control, 84 HARv. L R.Ev. 1577 (1971). 
169. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64. See text accompanying note 328 infra. 
170. Income Tax Act of 1970, c. 63, §§ 90-95. See Verchere &: Pound, The New 
Canadian Tax Law: A Summary of How It Operates, 37 J. TAX 220, 223 (1972). 
171. See [Doing Business in Europe] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 30,603 CTuly 19, 1972): 
2 EUROPEAN TAXATION 1/4 (1971); CCH, HARV. WORLD TAX SERIES, TAXATION IN GER• 
MANY 1f 1814. 
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as the European Common Market, the holding company is used to 
accomplish transnational mergers. A direct merger involving the 
dissolution of the constituent companies across national boundaries 
is impossible under some laws and, even where possible, generally in-
volves tremendous expenses, primarily in taxes, as the consequence 
of moving the central administration of a company from one country 
to another.172 In reality, such transnational mergers have taken place. 
In view of the uncertainty regarding the legal consequences of such 
mergers on the Continent, the current corporate practice is to form a 
mutual subsidiary company to which the operations of the integrat-
ing companies are transferred. The stock of the new subsidiary is 
divided between the two founders pursuant to their agreement.173 
The two companies can thus set up new operating companies, divid-
ing the stock between themselves and converting the two parents into 
holding companies, which are managed by the same directors. The 
result is the creation of one economic unit instead of two, despite a 
legal separation.174 
Generally speaking, the MNE may adopt the most beneficial 
business form for transnational business operations, taking into ac-
count the relevant home country laws, host country laws, and inter-
national treaties. The example of an American-based MNE can be 
used to illustrate the adaptability of MNEs to changing circum-
stances. What business form is appropriate for investment in Latin 
America? Assume that tax factors are critical and that other con-
siderations are unaffected by the investor's decision. The MNE may: 
(a) establish an operating subsidiary in the Latin American country, 
directly or through an intermediate holding company, or (b) set up 
a branch (permanent establishment) in the Latin American country. 
For American tax purposes, the operating subsidiary is a separate 
tax entity.175 The enterprise may enjoy tax deferral until repatria-
tion of eamings.176 Repatriation may be accomplished through the 
intermediate holding company serving as a profit center abroad. The 
172. See generally E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 364-87; Conard, Corporate Fusion in 
the Common Market, 14 AM. J. CoMP. L. 573 (1966). Liquidation involves taxation of 
the hidden reserves and thus prevents many mergers. See, e.g., Storm, A New Impulse 
Toward a European Company, 26 Bus. I.Aw. 1443 (1971) [hereinafter Storm), 
173. See, e.g., Angelo, supra note 2, at 504-05; Mann, The European Company, 19 
INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 468, 478-79 (1970). 
174. The Agfa-Gevaert "merger," between the largest German and Belgium manufac• 
turers of photographic products, is an example in point. 
175. See notes 290-300 & 316 infra and accompanying text. 
176. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 951-64. 
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MNE may also en joy special tax treatment because of investment in 
developing countries.171 In addition, operation through a subsidiary 
can be desirable from the host country's viewpoint. Frequently the 
MNE may enjoy the benefits of concessions laws, which encourage 
investment by providing for national treatment (nondiscriminatory 
treatment as a domestic investor) only if a separate entity is estab-
lished in the host country. In other instances, domestic incorporation 
is obligatory.178 
If the MNE prefers, on the other hand, to launch its foreign 
investment through a permanent establishment in the Latin Ameri-
can country, the foreign investment will be taxable in the United 
States as part of MNE operations. This would enable the United 
States investor to deduct early period anticipated losses from the 
venture abroad.179 A third alternative open to an American-based 
MNE investing in Latin America is to establish another United 
States corporation, complying with the Western Hemisphere trade 
corporation provisions that grant a special tax deduction to qualifying 
corporations.180 Also available to an American-based MNE for invest-
ment abroad is the new Domestic International Sales Corporation 
(DISC).181 By utilizing this corporate instrumentality, the domestic 
corporation that engages primarily in export sales and meets certain 
other requirements qualifies for a fifty per cent tax deferral of earn-
ings abroad. Thus, an enterprise may choose among many alterna-
tives, each with its own peculiar advantages, when considering 
foreign investment. 
177. The main advantages result from the foreign tax credit provision, which, after 
the Revenue Act of 1962, resulted in special treatment for foreign corporations in less 
developed countries. INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, § 902. Section 1248(d)(3) provides an 
exemption for the gains from a sale or exchange of stock owned by a foreign corpora-
tion in a lesser developed country. Sections 951-64 (particularly sections 954(b)(l), 
955(b)(l), &: 955(c)) provide certain exceptions from the 1962 abolition of the tax deferral 
for Subpart F income for foreign companies in lesser developed countries. See generally 
Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries: A Critical 
Appraisal, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 1393 (1966). 
178. See Tm: AlTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMIITEE To STUDY THE .ANTrrnusr 
LAws, REPORT 87 (1955) [hereinafter Armnmsr LAws]. 
179. This is a very important factor in high-risk operations or when losses are antici-
pated for the first years of the investment. However, a tax treaty between the countries 
involved can alter the applicable rules. See Hadari, Tax Treaties and Their Role in the 
Financial Planning of the Multinational Enterprise, 20 AM. J. CoMP. L. 111 (1972) 
[hereinafter Hadari]. 
180. INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, §§ 921-22. 
181. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 991-97 for a definition of DISC and related terms. 
See also B. BilTKER &: J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS ANO 
SHAREHOLDERS § 17.14 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter B. BITl'KER &: J. EusnCE]. 
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2. European Business Forms 
The business entities forming an MNE represent not only dif-
ferences between countries, but also between available alternatives 
·within a given country. In Britain, for example, the most important 
form of business is the company limited by shares, which may be 
a "public" or a "private" company. The major differences between 
these forms lie in restrictions on the number of shareholders and the 
transferability of shares. Private companies must have at least two, 
but no more than fifty, shareholders (although exceptions are made 
for current and former employees), must impose restrictions on the 
transferability of shares, and are prohibited from offering their 
shares to the public.182 A public company must have at least seven 
shareholders183 and does not have restrictions on either the maximum 
number of shareholders or on the transferability of shares.184 The 
private company is much more prevalent than the public company, 
and may command substantial resources and employ large numbers 
of employees; thus, the private company is a potential business form 
for an MNE's subsidiary in Britain. Most of the provisions of the 
British Companies Act apply equally to private and public compa-
nies. These two business forms appear in the many countries that 
follow the British system such as Israel,1811 Australia,186 and South 
Africa.187 
On the Continent there is a different statutory framework.188 
182. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 1, 28. 
183. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § I. 
184. The British public companies should not be confused with government-owned 
corporations or with publicly held corporations (or "quoted" companies). See L. GOWER, 
supra note 162, at 234-41. Public companies can be privately owned and not listed on 
the Stock Exchange. 
185. Israeli Companies Ordinance of 1929, as amended, § 25A. The Ordinance was 
based on the English Companies Act of 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23. 
186. Australian Uniform Companies Act, §§ 5, 15, which has been adopted by the 
separate Australian states. See, e.g., Companies Act of 1961 of New South Wales, §§ 5, 
15. The Australian facsimile of the British private company is known as a "proprietary 
company." 
187. Companies Act, No. 46 of 1926, § 104. 
188. The literature on the various types of European business organizations includes 
THE COMPANY-LAW, STRUCTURE AND REFORM IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES (C. de Houghton 
ed. 1970) [hereinafter C. de Houghton]; R. PENNINGTON, COMPANIES IN THE COMMON 
MARKET (2d ed. 1970); E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 87-117; Bott&: Rosener, The Groupe-
ment d'Interet Economique, J. Bus. L., Oct. 1970, at 313; DeVries &: Juenger, Limited 
Liability Contract: The Gmbtl, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 866 (1964); Fabricius, The Private 
Company in German Law, J. Bus. L., July 1970, at 229; Kohler, New Corporation Laws 
in Germany (1966) and France (1967) and the Trend Towards a Uniform Corporation 
Law for the Common Market, 45 TuL. L. REv. 58 (1968); Kohler, The New Limited 
Liability Company Law of France, 24 Bus. I.Aw. 435 (1969); Scholten, Company Law in 
Europe, 4 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 377 (1968); Steefel &: Falkenhausen, The New German 
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There are continental equivalents of the stock corporation.189 How-
ever, there is also the limited liability company, in which ownership 
is not normally evidenced by share certificates but rather by quotas 
with transferability limitations.190 This hybrid business form be-
tween a stock company and a partnership is without parallel in 
Anglo-American law.191 The limited liability company is subject 
to more flexible statutory requirements than stock companies, and 
this type of company is frequently found when there are only a 
small number of owners with no intention of going public. 
These and other forms of doing business are subject to different 
legal requirements according to the law of the country of incorpora-
tion. The management of the MNE must consider many variables 
including the requisite necessary capacity to form the business 
unit;192 the required minimum or maximum number of share-
holders; the capital structure; the form of shares (registered or 
bearer); voting rights; the rights and liabilities of shareholders, credi-
tors, employees, and officers; the eligibility of directors;193 and the 
various provisions relating to control of the day-to-day operation of 
the firm. 
Of more enduring concern to the MNE may be the differences in 
the rules of management and control of the company. Different legal 
requirements in various countries may interfere with the efficient 
management of the MNE, causing artificial fragmentation of the 
enterprise and additional operating costs. One example is provided 
by German law. A German subsidiary of an American-based MNE 
Stock Corporation Law, 52 CoRNELL L. REv. 518 (1967) [hereinafter Steefel &: Falken-
hausenJ; Vagts, Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 
80 HARV. L. REv. 211 (1966) [hereinafter Perspectives]; Wooldridge, The Private Com• 
pany in French Law, J. Bus. L., Oct. 1970, at 317. 
189. They are the "societe anonyme" (S.A.) in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and 
Switzerland; "aktiengesellschaft" (A.G.) in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; and the 
"societa per azioni" (S.p.A.) in Italy. ICC 26!1, supra note 166, at 8. In addition there is 
the "naamloze vennootschap" (N.V.) in the Netherlands. 
190. Id. The limited liability company is known as "Societe a responsabilite limitee" 
(S.a.r.l.) in France; "Societe de personnes a responsabilite limitee" (S.P.R.L.) in Belgium; 
"Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung" (G.m.b.H.) in Germany; "Sociedad a respon-
sibilita limitada" (L.T.D.A.) in the Latin American countries; and "besloten vennoot-
schap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid" (B.V.) in the Netherlands. 
191. Id. 
192. For instance, in Belgium only two or more natural persons (not corporations) 
may form an S.P.R.L., DROIT CML ET COMMERCIAL bk. 1, tit. IX, § ll9. (Codes Larder 
1970). 
193. Although under most enabling corporation laws there are no restrictions con-
cerning the nationality or residence of directors, some do have restrictions. In Switzer-
land, for instance, except in holding companies, the majority of directors mlll!t be of 
SwiM nationality and domicile. ConE FEDERAL DES OBLIGATIONS § 7II (Payot 1962). 
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has a different structure of power and control than its American 
parent corporation. While under prevailing corporation laws in the 
United States the corporation is managed by a single board of direc-
tors that is appointed by and responsible to the shareholders, a Ger-
man company is managed according to a two-tier system consisting 
of a board of management and a supervisory board.194 The super-
visory board oversees the board of management and reports to the 
shareholders.195 It appoints or removes the members of the board of 
management, 196 but does not interfere with the day-to-day conduct 
of business, which is in the hands of the board of management.197 
The supervisory board members, except for labor representatives, 
are elected by the shareholders in a straight-line voting system.198 
The German two-tier system, with modifications, has been introduced 
in France under its law on Commercial Companies of I 966.199 
A variant of Germany's two-tiered management system was en-
acted in the Netherlands in 1971. A supervisory board may be estab-
lished by all Dutch companies,200 but must be established by "large" 
companies.201 A company is a "large company" if it has capital, 
including reserves, of at least ten million guilders, it or its subsid-
iaries have an "employee's council," and the company and its 
subsidiaries normally employ one hundred persons or more in 
the Netherlands.202 The supervisory board in large companies nomi-
nates and removes the members of the board of management ( direc-
teuren), 203 adopts the financial statements,204 and approves important 
specified decisions of the board of management.205 The members 
194. AKTIENGESETZ 1965 (AKTG) §§ 76-116 (the German Stock Corporation Act of 
1965). See CCH CoMM. MKT. REPORTS (transl. F. Juenger &: L. Schmidt 1967) for an 
unofficial bilingual translation. For a discussion of the two-tier system in Europe, see C. 
de Houghton, supra note 188, at 140-63; E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 91-155; Perspectives, 
supra note 188, at 50. 
195. AKTG § 11l (1965). 
196. AKTG § 84 (1965). 
197. AKTG § lll(4) (1965). 
198. AKTG § 101 (1965). 
199. C. COM., app. 8, pt. 2, §§ 118-50 (Petits Codes Dalloz 1967). 
200. WETBOEK VAN KOOPHANDEL (W.v.K.) § 50 (the Netherlands Business Corporation 
Code). See CCH COMM. MKT. REPORTS No. 193 (transl. Morris, J. van de Ven &: Westbroek 
1972) for an unofficial English translation. See also van de Ven, Corporate Develop-
ments in the Netherlands, 27 Bus. LAW. 873 (1972) [hereinafter van de Ven]. 
201. W.v.K. § 52h. 
202. W.v.K. § 52c(2). 
203. w.v.K. § 521. 
204. w.v.K. § 52m. 
205. The following actions are subject to supervisory board approval: issuance of 
shares and debentures by the company, listing shares on a stock exchange, collaboration 
with other firms, acquisition of a large portion of the stock of other companies, and 
termination of employment of a considerable number of employees. W.v.K. § 52n. 
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of the supervisory board are normally elected by the board itself.206 
A large corporation that belongs to an MNE may be exempted, 
however, from some of the foregoing rules if it is a subsidiary of 
another company and most of the employees of the whole enterprise 
are employed outside the Netherlands, or if it is a company that 
almost exclusively renders management and financial services to such 
a subsidiary.207 Additional exceptions are provided for Dutch affili-
ates of foreign companies.208 Other EEC members will have to amend 
their company laws to provide for dual management, should the 
Commission's fifth directive on harmonization of company law be 
adopted.200 
Another feature of the German law that has an impact on MNE 
operations in that country is the concept of "codetermination" under 
which a company's employees participate in management.210 Two 
types of codetermination presently exist in Germany: full code-
termination in companies with over 1,000 employees in the coal and 
steel industries;211 and partial codetermination in all limited liability 
companies (G.m.b.H.) with over 500 employees and in all stock com-
panies (A.G.) except family-owned companies with fewer than 500 
employees.212 Full codetermination entitles the representatives of 
the workers and the shareholders to an equal number of seats on 
the supervisory board.213 In addition, a neutral balancing member 
is chosen to represent the public interest.214 In partial codetermina-
tion, one third of the supervisory board is appointed by the em-
ployees215 and there is no labor member on the board of manage-
ment.216 
Finally, the relationship between the employees and the com-
206. W.v.K. § 52h. 
207. W.v.K. § 52c(3). 
208. (Doing Business in Europe] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1!11 26,7II, 26,721 (1972). 
209, ECC Commission, Proposal for a Fifth Directive, Oct. 19, 1972, 15 E.E.C. J.O. 
Cl31/149 (1972) [hereinafter Fifth Directive]. See Fifth Directive on Company Law 
Harmonization Proposed, [New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 11 9532 (1972). 
The Fifth Directive is proposed pursuant to the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 54(3)(g), 298 U.N.T.S. 39. 
210. See generally C. de Houghton, supra note 188, at 213-21; E. STEIN, supra note 
147, at 92-97; Steefel & Falkenhausen, supra note 188, at 537; Perspectives, supra note 
188, at 65. 
2II. Law on Codetermination of Employees in Supervisory Councils and Executive 
Boards of Coal, Iron & Steel Producing Industries of May 21, 1951, § 4, [1951] BGBI. I 
847. 348 (Mitbestimmung) [hereinafter Law of May 21, 1951]. 
212. Law on Works Council of Oct. II, 1952, § 76(i), [1952] BGBI I 681, 691 (Betriebs-
verfassungsgesetz) [hereinafter Law of Oct. II, 1952]. 
213. Law of May 21, 1951, § 4, [1951] BGBl. I 348, 349. 
214. Law of May 21, 1951, § 8, [1951] BGBI. I 348. 
215. Law of Oct. II, 1952, § 76(i), [1952] BGBl. I 691. 
216. Law of Oct. II, 1952, § 76, [1952] BGBl, I 691. 
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pany's management is governed by the new Works Council Act.217 
The Act provides for the management, duties, and rights of the 
Works Council elected by the employees. The Works Council is 
entitled to discuss and negotiate labor disputes with management,218 
and if no agreement is reached, a conciliation board established by 
both parties will decide the dispute.219 The Works Council has the 
right to be informed and consulted on various labor matters.220 
Significantly, the Works Council is entitled to codetermination on 
many important economic, business, and social decisions that affect 
the welfare of the employees.221 The right of employees to be in-
formed and consulted by management is broad enough to include 
such matters as structural changes and mergers of the enterprise,222 
as well as various general economic subjects.223 
Other European countries also provide for employee representa-
tion in the managerial process. In France, although employees of an 
S.A. are not entitled to appoint members of either board, a company 
employing over fifty persons must establish a Works Council (comite 
d'enterprise), members of which are employees.224 Since 1968, a 
compulsory employees' profit-sharing program has been in effect.225 
In the Netherlands, under recently enacted legislation, a Dutch 
company or a local branch of a foreign company, which employs a 
hundred persons or more, is required to establish an Employees 
Council,226 elected by the employees. The company's director (bes-
tuurder) is also a member of the Council.227 The Council must be 
informed of the financial position of the company and its general 
business activities, and normally has advisory powers in certain im-
217. Law on Works Council of Jan. 15, 1972 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) [hereinafter 
Law of Jan. 15, 1972). See CCH CoMM. MKT. REPORTS (transl. H. Beinhauer 1972) for 
an unofficial English translation. 
218. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, § 74. 
219. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, § 76. 
220. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, § 90. 
221. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, §§ 87, 91, 99, 102. 
222. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, §§ 111-13. 
223. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, §§ 106-10. The Act provides for the establishment of an 
Economic Committee by the Works Council in enterprises with more than 100 perma• 
nent employees. 
224. Ordinance of Feb. 22, 1945, C. CoM. app. 2, pt. 2, at 514 (Petits Codes Dalloz 
1971). 
225. Ordinance No. 37-693 of Aug. 17, 1967, C. CoM. app. 2, pt. 2, at 527 (Petits 
Codes Dalloz 1971), supplemented by Decree No. 67-1112 of Dec. 19, 1967, C. CoM. 
app. 2, pt. 2, at 532 (Petits Codes Dalloz 1967). 
226. Wet op de Ondememingsraden, art. 2.1 (Employees Council Act of 1971). 
227. Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, art. 6.1. 
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portant corporate matters specified in the law.228 The Council's ad-
vice is particularly important in certain matters relating to the 
employees such as wages, training courses, hiring, promoting, and 
firing of employees, and is absolutely required in other labor matters, 
including pension and profit-sharing plans, which are void absent 
the Council's advice.229 The Council may recommend members to 
the supervisory board in large companies230 and object to appoint-
ments to the supervisory board.231 Such an objection may be over-
ruled by the Dutch Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische 
Raad).232 The codetermination system is now proposed for all EEC 
members.233 
V. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
A. The Modern Enterprise 
The forces which have generated these multinational corporate 
groups are not simple .... 
One has been the emergence of the corporate form itself, endowed 
with attributes that give it extraordinary advantages as a vehicle for 
doing business. The corporation can count on perpetual life; it can 
hope to attain unlimited size; it can bear children or create parents 
or generate siblings; and it can endow each of its newborn relations 
with such nationality as seems convenient.284 
MNEs are integrated on a global basis, a characteristic not en-
joyed by political institutions.235 Since effective regulation of the 
affairs of a national government is largely confined to activities 
within its borders, any extraterritorial objective "involves either a 
conflict, a negotiation, or a concordat with other sovereign powers."236 
By contrast, the upper management of an MNE can effectuate its 
228. Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, art. 25.1. See van de Ven, supra note 200, at 
875. The company is exempted from giving such information and from the Council's 
advice if significant interests of the company would be endangered. 
229. Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, art. 27.I. See van de Ven, supra note 200, at 
875. 
230. W.v.K. § 52h(4). 
231. W.v.K. § 52h(6). 
232. W.v.K. § 52h(9), (10). 
233. Fifth Directive, supra note 209. 
234. Vernon, supra note 86, at 157. The sharp increase in the efficiency of trans-
portation and communication was also mentioned as a significant force contributing 
to the emergence of the MNE. 
235. See Timberg, The Corporation as a Technique of International Administration, 
19 U. Cm. L. REv. 739, 741 (1952). The author favored using the corporate concept to 
accomplish the integration of the international political community. 
236. Id. 
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worldwide strategy provided only that a nation does not forbid 
foreign investment and that the MNE honors domestic laws.237 
Modem corporations now exercise powers once available only 
to natural persons. Thus, most contemporary legal systems have rec-
ognized the corporation as a legal entity separate from the individuals 
who own it.238 One of the primary functions of the corporate form 
is the insulation of individual stockholders from liability for cor-
porate debts. Additional advantages and attributes include separation 
of management and control from ownership, easy transferability of 
ownership, ability to retain earnings for internal growth, large invest-
ments in research and development, and attraction of large sums of 
funds either through equity participation or debentures. These 
factors and the ever increasing sophistication of managerial skills 
and techniques have brought the corporation to its present status as 
the principal mode of business organization. Thus, large publicly 
held corporations now control the economies of most countries.239 
B. A Corporation's Power To Incorporate 
and Own Other Corporations 
The legal prerequisite that is fundamental to the establishment 
of an MNE is the power of a corporation to purchase and hold stock 
of another corporation. This power is recognized by most legal 
systems. In the United Kingdom, for example, a company has this 
power unless expressly prohibited.240 Similarly, in Canada the power 
is provided by the Dominion Companies Act.241 In the United 
States, at common law a corporation had no power either to subscribe 
for, or purchase, stock in another corporation absent an express pro-
vision either in its charter or by statute, although exceptions were 
recognized if the stock purchase was a necessary or reasonable means 
of achieving a corporation's objectives.242 Corporate acquisition and 
retention of stock was occasionally found to be contrary to public 
policy.248 Even when express power to invest in other corporations 
was authorized, it was not interpreted to include the power to sub-
237. Cf. id. 
238. See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, §§ 5-14 for the typical attributes 
of a corporation. 
239. See A. BERLE &: G. MEANs, supra note 168, at 119-40, for a discussion of the evolu-
tion of the modern corporation. 
240. 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 2824. Cf. L. GoWER, supra note 162, at 194-95. 
241. CAN. REY. STAT. § 16(l)(c). 
242. De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U.S. 40 (1899): 
California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1897); First Natl. Bank v. National Exch. 
Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1875). 
243. See, e.g., State ex rel. Boynton v. Wheat Farming Co., 153 Kan. 282, 110 P.2d 
795 (1941); Robotham v, Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 A. 842 (1903). 
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scribe for stock in the formation of another company.244 Presently, 
however, the power of a corporation to acquire another's stock is 
granted by the corporation laws of most states;245 but, if under state 
law a domestic corporation is not allowed to own stock in particular 
instances, the prohibition applies to ownership of stock in a foreign 
corporation as well.246 
Many corporation laws require more than one incorporator to 
establish a corporation, and further provide that incorporators must 
be natural persons.247 These requirements, however, do not prevent 
the use of "dummy" incorporators to establish subsidiaries and hold-
ing companies of the controlling parent.248 A parent company can 
use persons who have no real interest in the corporation to act as 
incorporators in order to comply with statutory formalities; usually, 
after incorporation the dummies' shares are then transferred to 
the real party in interest-the controlling corporation.249 Reflecting 
the prevailing realities, the Model Business Corporation Act was 
revised in 1962 to allow incorporation by one person, including a 
corporation. 250 
Corporation statutes frequently require additional formalities 
relevant to the establishment of an MNE. Some require that a corpo-
ration have more than one shareholder, as, for example, in England 
where a private company must have at least two shareholders.251 
The use of such requirements, however, has not precluded the use of 
dummies to assure full de facto ownership by the parent corporation. 
C. Recognition of the Wholly Owned Subsidiary as 
a Distinct Entity 
I. The General Rule and the Enterprise Theory 
Another legal prerequisite to the establishment and successful 
operation of the wholly owned subsidiary is the recognition of the 
244. 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 2829. Even a grant of such power in the 
articles of incorporation or in bylaws has not been sufficient in some cases, id. §§ 2830-32. 
245. Id. § 2833 (including citations to the various statutes). However, there are still 
state constitutional or statutory limitations on such power, restrictions that are in fact 
merely declaratory of the common law. Usually such resrictions are confined to cor-
porations of a particular kind, id. § 2834. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Am: § 4(g) 
(1969). 
246. 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 2835. 
247. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-48 (1953). 
248. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 185 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter H. HENN]. 
249. Id. 
250. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Am: § 53 (1969). The current trend among the 
states is to follow the Model Act and permit a single incorporator. H. HENN, supra 
note 248, § 131. 
251. See note 182 supra and accompanying text. 
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separate legal existence of "one-man" corporations. The leading 
English case, Salomon v. Salomon & Co.,252 
opened new vistas to company lawyers and the world of com-
merce .... It finally establish[ ed] the legality of the one-man com-
pany and showed that incorporation was as readily available to the 
small private partnership and sole trader as to the large public com-
pany ... ,253 
One-man corporations are also recognized by American law,254 and 
large corporations make extensive use of them in the creation of 
subsidiaries and holding companies. 
In civil law countries, the issue was not resolved quite so easily. 
Originally, civil law provided that a corporation was created by a 
contract among stockholders, rather than by a charter granted by the 
state.255 Under civil law, therefore, the one-man corporation was "an 
anomaly-a one-man contract."256 Today, many civil law countries 
permit wholly owned subsidiaries, although in some countries it re-
mains uncertain whether the parent company may be held responsible 
for the debts of its subsidiaries.257 Such financial responsibility is also 
possible, in certain circumstances, under the new German Law of 
Related Companies.258 
Generally, however, the parent corporation, its subsidiaries, and 
all of the related holding and affiliated companies are recognized and 
treated as separate and distinct legal entities. This is true even if the 
parent owns all the stock of the subsidiary, and the management of 
the corporations is identical.259 Absent illegitimate purpose, the 
252. [189'7] A.C. 22, 
253. L. GoWER, supra note 162, at 70. In addition, it was possible for "a trader not 
merely to limit his liability to the money he put into the enterprise but even to avoid 
any serious risk to the major part of that." Id. 
254. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 163, § 128; G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION L4.W AND 
PR4.CTICE § 751 (1959, 1968 Supp.) [hereinafter G. HORNSTEIN]. 
255. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 327-28 & n.37, 419; Alyea, Subsidiary Corpora-
tions Under the Civil Law and Common Law, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1227, 1229-34 (1953) 
[hereinafter Alyea]. 
256. Vagts, supra note 2, at 742 n.13 (1970). 
257. See Alyea, supra note 255, at 1232. 
258. See text accompanying notes 377-79 infra. 
259. See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Brown v. 
Margrande Compania Naviera, 281 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1968); Garrett v. Southern 
Ry., 173 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Tenn. 1959), affd., 278 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1960); Berkey v. 
Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926); Botwinick v. Credit Exch., Inc., 419 
Pa. 65, 213 A.2d 349 (1965). 
In England, although the theory of agency was applied to lift the veil of a sub-
sidiary company, Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham Corp., [1939] 4 All E.R. 
116 (K.B.), it is still an exception to the general rule. See Ebbw Vale U.D.C. v. South 
Wales Traffic Area Licensing Auth., [1951] 2 K.B. 366 (C.A.). See generally Pickering, 
The Company as a Separate Legal Entity, 31 Mon. L. R.Ev. 481 (1968). 
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separate corporate identities will generally be recognized. However, 
the corporate veil will be pierced when "the corporate device has 
been used to defraud creditors, to evade existing obligations, to cir-
cumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate a monopoly, or to protect 
knavery or crime . • . :•200 
Courts have gone further, in exceptional cases, to ignore the 
separate existence of corporations in order to treat affected parties 
"equitably." In the context of a multiple corporations case, the 
Supreme Court explicitly recognized: 
It is not, properly speaking, a rule, but a convenient way of designat-
ing the application, in particular circumstances of the broader equi-
table principle that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized gen-
erally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when so to do 
would work fraud or injustice.261 
Courts have not clearly articulated the theory under which the 
corporate form may be disregarded for the purposes of preventing 
fraud or injustice. One commentator has attempted to classify de-
cisions by the courts, which use a variety of terms and purport to 
apply many different theories, into five theories: 262 the alter ego 
theory, the identity theory, the instrumentality theory, the agency 
260. Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 
HARV. L R.Ev. 1373, 1401 (1938). For evasion of statute cases, see, e.g., Chicago, M. &: 
St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic&: Commerce Assn., 247 U.S. 490 (1918); Northern Sec. 
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (attempt to evade antitrust laws through 
holding company). For evasion of contract cases, see, e.g., Dairy Co-operative Assn. v. 
Brandes Creamery, 147 Ore. 488, 30 P.2d 338 (1934). For disregard of a subsidiary cor-
poration when it is used to defraud creditors, see, e.g., Eisenrod v. Utley, 211 F.2d 678 
(9th Cir. 1954). 
The English courts have occasionally pierced the corporate veil, finding British sub-
sidiaries to be the agents of the American parent corporation. In re F.G. (Films) Ltd., 
[1953] 1 W.L.R. 483 (Ch.) (emphasizing thin capitalization); Firestone Tyre &: Rubber 
Co. v. Llewellyn, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 464 (H.L) (agent for tax purposes). See also In re 
Greater London Properties Ltd. Lease, [1959] I W.L.R. 503 (Ch.); Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale Soc., Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L., Sc.); Holdsworth &: Co. v. Cad-
dies, [1955] I W.L.R. 352 (H.L., Sc.); Spittle v. Thames Grit 8e Aggregate, [1937] 4 All 
E.R. IOI (K.B.). 
The case law on the Continent does not vary significantly from its common law 
counterpart. Continental systems also developed tl1e doctrine of lifting the corporate 
veil in exceptional circumstances. The implementation of the doctrine varies from 
country to country, thus no general rule can be stated. In the continental countries the 
theory has not yet achieved the status it enjoys in the United States. See Cohn &: 
Simitis, "Lifting the Veil" in the Company Laws of the European Continent, 12 INTL. 
&: COMP. L.Q. 189 (1963). However, Germany achieved far-reaching results along the 
lines of the enterprise theory in the provisions regulating the Konzern, AKTG 1965. 
See notes 369-86 infra and accompanying text. 
261. Taylor v. Standard Gas &: Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939) (the "Deep Rock" 
case). 
262. Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1102, 1116-21 (1971) (liability of a corporation for the con-
tracts of its subsidiary). See also Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 979 
(1971). 
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theory, and the estoppel theory. However, since courts have generally 
recognized little more than a semantic distinction between the first 
three theories, the sounder view is to distinguish between disre-
garding the corporate entity on the one hand, and applying general 
legal concepts to this area, such as agency or estoppel, on the other. 
Thus, some cases that speak of disregarding the corporate entity are 
more properly understood as applications of general agency theories, 
as, for example, when the acts of a controlled corporation are attrib-
uted to the controlling corporation for the purpose of imposing 
liability because the former is found to be the agent of the latter. 
This most often occurs in the context of a contractual claim when it 
is demonstrated that the controlled corporation entered into a 
contract on behalf of the controlling corporation, or when a tort is 
attributable directly to the controlling corporation under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.263 In these agency cases, it is the con-
trolled corporation that does the act in question; in the other line 
of cases the broader enterprise does the act; the courts look through 
the corporate form of the controlled corporation in order to reach 
the underlying economic reality of a single business undertaking. 
This distinction is not always observed by the courts, which often 
speak in terms of disregarding the corporate entity while neverthe-
less purporting to apply agency concepts.264 
In those cases actually disregarding the corporate entity, the 
recurring theme is that courts will focus on the whole enterprise 
as a single economic unit, rather than on the multiple-corporate 
forms used by such an enterprise. Therefore, this general theory is 
more properly termed the "enterprise" theory.265 This theory, prop-
erly construed, encompasses at least three theories that have hereto-
fore been regarded as separate and distinct by the courts. First, the 
enterprise theory may be invoked to disregard dummy corporations 
or sham transactions involving fraud or lacking any business sub-
stance. 266 Second, in applying the enterprise theory, courts have 
occasionally focused on the fact that the controlled corporation is 
so closely identified with its parent corporation as to make effectively 
263. See, e.g., Chicago, M. &: St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic &: Commerce Assn., 247 
U.S. 490, 501 (1918); Fissez v. Intl. Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Wyoming Constr. 
Co. v. Western Cas. &: Sur. Co., 275 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960). 
264. See Ballantine, supra note 149, at 18. See Lowendahl v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 
247 App. Div. 144, 155-56, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 74, afjd., 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936). 
265. See note 149 supra and accompanying text. 
266. See text accompanying notes 291-95 infra for the application of the sham 
theory for tax purposes. 
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the two corporations one "identity" of enterprise.267 "In the 'identity' 
theory the separate corporate entity of the subsidiary is disregarded 
and the parent and the subsidiaries are regarded as one."268 Third, 
in other circumstances the enterprise theory has been applied when 
a corporation is under the control of another corporation and has 
acted as its instrumentality in general or in a particular transaction. 
Some courts have used this factor to formulate an "instrumentality" 
rule.269 A frequently cited decision summarized the conditions that 
justify the invocation of this rule: 
Restating the instrumentality rule, we may say that in any case 
except express agency, estoppel, or direct tort, three elements must 
be proved: 
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but 
complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business 
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate 
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will 
or existence of its own; and 
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to com-
mit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other 
positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention of 
plaintiff's legal rights; and 
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately 
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.270 
It should be emphasized that under the enterprise theory the 
controlling company is held responsible for the acts in question 
because it is the real actor in the transaction and its management had 
the decision-making power with respect to the particular activity per~ 
formed. Under such circumstances, any given act of the controlled 
company may be imputed to the controlling company since, con-
ceptually, the controlled company is but a part of the larger enter-
prise. But, all other activities, when the subsidiary has acted inde-
pendently, may not normally be imputed to the parent. Under the 
enterprise theory, the controlled company is in fact "a fragment of 
the larger corporate combine which actually conducts the busi-
267. See, e.g., Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); State ex rel. Mon-
arch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942). This is a 
situation where for all practical purposes the two corporations are one economic unit, 
the independence of the controlled corporation did not in effect exist, and an adherence 
to the fiction of separate entity would serve only to defeat justice by allowing the 
economic entity to escape liability. 
268. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 App. Div. at 156, 287 N.Y.S. at 75. 
269, See Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940), for a list of the circum-
stances relevant to the application of the instrumentality rule. 
270. Lowendahl v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 247 App. Div. at 157, 287 N.Y.S. at 76. 
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ness."2~1 Therefore, such subsidiary or affiliate is not necessarily a 
sham, a dummy for, or identical in all respects to, its controlling 
company. Under such an approach, for example, a tax haven com-
pany, which has no real substance, and a big operating subsidiary 
of an MNE may both be disregarded with respect to certain activities 
that in effect are controlled by the parent and therefore are regarded 
as acts of the enterprise as a whole. Such an enterprise might be the 
entire MNE or any group of companies of which the controlled 
company is but a fragment. 
While. it is premature to announce the death of the distinct 
entity concept in the context of affiliated companies, recent develop-
ments have made it difficult to define with precision the "exceptional 
cases" in which a subsidiary will now be treated as an agent or frag-
ment of its parent.272 Whether a corporation is an agent or fragment 
of its parent is a question of both fact and policy that cannot be 
answered in vacuo.213 It is thus difficult to generalize a rule emerging 
from the many cases struggling with differing instances of inter-
corporate relations. The following guidelines have been suggested 
to assure recognition of separate legal entities: 
(I) A separate financial unit should be set up and maintained ..• 
to carry on the normal strains [of the business]. 
(2) The financial and business records of the two units should be 
kept separate. 
271. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414,418,223 N.E.2d 6, 8, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585,588 
(1966). The enterprise theory has been expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in 
the labor field: 
The [National Labor Relations] Board is entitled to show that these separate cor-
porations are not what they appear to be, that in truth they are but divisions or 
departments of a "single enterprise" •••• {T]here is a question whether in fact 
the economic enterprise is one, the corporation form being largely paper arrange-
ments that do not reflect the business realities. One company may in fact be oper-
ated as a division of another; one may be only a shell, inadequately financed; the 
affairs of the group may be so intermingled that no distinct corporate lines are 
maintained. These are some, though by no means all, of the relevant considera-
tions, as the authorities recognize •••• The petition should be reinstated insofar 
as it charges the existence of "a single enterprise" • • • • 
NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc. 361 U.S. 398, 402-04 (1960). The Deena rationale has been 
followed in P.F. Collier&: Sons Corp. v. FTC, 427 F,2d.26l, 266-70 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 824 (1970); ACME Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 422 F.2d 
1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750, 752 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965). ' 
272. See 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 43; 2 G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 254, §§ 751-
59; N. LArnN, THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS§§ 24-26 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter N. LArnN]; 
Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REv. 
1122 (1958). 
273. National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1965); 
Bowater S.S. Co. v. Patterson, 303 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1962). See N. LATIIN, supra note 272, 
§ 25; E. LAITY, supra note 149, at 220; Ballantine, supra note 149, at 18-19. 
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(3) The formal barriers between the two management structures 
should be maintained .... 
(4) The two units should not be represented as being one unit.274 
While stock control and common directors are generally pre-
requisites to the application of the enterprise theory, they are insuf-
ficient by themselves to warrant disregard of the separate identity 
of the controlled corporation. 
Those familiar with present day methods of corporate control will 
not be so naive as to suppose that the complete domination in fact of 
its subsidiaries by a holding company owning all their stock is in 
any way inconsistent with scrupulous recognition of their corporate 
entities, or with maintenance of separate accounts and distinct per-
sonnels of officers and directors.275 
The actual exercise of control is a much more important factor.276 
It should be noted that even subsidiaries and affiliates that adhere to 
the foregoing guidelines would be assured of only general recognition 
as separate legal entities; they would not be considered sham corpo-
rations and the identity concept would not be applicable to them. 
It would not prevent, however, the application of the enterprise 
theory to specific transactions that are controlled by the controlling 
corporation or that are otherwise attributed to that corporation. 
One should keep in mind this distinction between the general ap-
plication o{ the enterprise theory so as to negate the corporate 
identity completely, and the restricted application of the theory to 
specific situations. This restricted application of the theory might 
be termed partial disregard of the corporate identity; the terminology 
used notwithstanding, the end result is the attribution of an act to 
a single economic enterprise. 
In many cases the entity status has been denied for contract or 
tort purposes if the subsidiary or affiliate was inadequately capital-
ized. 277 Courts have also given effect to the enterprise theory in 
274. Douglas &: Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 
39 YALE L.J. 193, 196-97 (1929). 
275. United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 498, 506 (1936) (Stone, J., 
dissenting). 
276. See Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 575, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (1967); text accom-
panying note 270 supra. For a discussion of factors other than control which will sup-
port a finding of separation, see Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966). 
277. See Herman v. Mobile Homes Corp., 317 Mich. 233, 26 N.W.2d 757 (1947); 
E. I..ATIY, supra note 149, at 119-41; Comment, Inadequately Capitalized Subsidiaries, 
19 U. CHI. L. REv. 872 (1952); Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1959). See also Comment, Alter-
native Methods of Piercing the Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B.U. L. 
R.Ev. 123 (1968); Comment, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 
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going behind the corporate structure to reach the single economic 
entity for narrow purposes. Thus, a Canadian bank and its French 
subsidiary have been treated as one entity for service of process 
purposes;278 two corporations were permitted to maintain a joint 
action to recover consequential damages for in jury to one corpora-
tion's property caused by the taking of the affiliat:e's propert:y;279 
a court held that a parent corporation could be liable for debts 
incurred by its subsidiary prior to dissolution of the subsidiary;280 
and an individual stockholder and a sister corporation were held 
liable for services and materials provided to a brother corporat:ion.281 
Furthermore, when multiple corporations are used to avoid obli-
gations under a collective bargaining contract:282 or to avoid back-pay 
orders,283 the courts will look to the~conomic unit to avoid defraud-
ing creditors or circumventing contractual obligations. 
A recent development: important: to the MNE is legislation di-
rected toward regulating groups of companies.284 These legislative 
innovations suggest that governing authorities, in addition to courts, 
will occasionally ignore the distinct entity concept and instead view 
the corporate network as a single economic ent:ity.285 The rationale 
for this departure from traditional doctrine is a desire to protect the 
interests of third parties and minority stockholders. It is submitted 
Omo ST. L.J. 441 (1967); Annot., supra note 262 (contracts); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1343 
(1966) (torts). Cf. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944); Taylor v. Standard Gas &: 
Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). 
278. Public Admr. of County of New York v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 
224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967). Similarly in Taca Intl. Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls• 
Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 99, 204 N.E.2d 329, 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129, ll!O 
(1965), an American subsidiary was held to be a "separately incorporated department 
or instrumentality" of a British parent company for service of process purposes. 
279. California Zinc Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 591 (Ct. Cl. 1947). 
280. Edwards v. Chicago&: N.W. Ry., 79 Ill. App. 2d 48, 223 N.E. 2d 163 (1967). 
281. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. 
Grace&: Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920). 
282. See, e.g., John Wiley &: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Wirtz v. 
Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1964). 
283. NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc. 361 U.S. 398 (1960). 
284. The major development in the area is the AKTIENGESETZ, the German Stock 
Company Act of 1965, with a whole set of rules to regulate many of the problems con• 
cerning related companies, AKTG §§ 291-338 (1965). See text accompanying notes 369-94 
infra for a discussion of the new German law and text accompanying notes 395-426 
infra for a discussion of the European company proposal. In England, the Companies 
Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 §§ 150-54, introduced provisions requiring consolidated 
accounts from holding and subsidiary companies. Accordingly, the holding company's 
accounts have to produce a true statement of the affairs of the group as a whole. The 
Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 4, extended the requirements by including more com• 
panies within the scope of the regulations. 
285. See, e.g., L. GowER, supra note 162, at 216. See generally id. at 194-200, 213-17. 
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that this rationale for the application of the enterprise theory should 
be extended from the micro-level to the macro-level to protect not 
only private interests but also national interests such as fiscal286 
and socio-economic policies.281 Furthermore, the enterprise theory 
should also be utilized in order to preserve the integrity of the MNE 
and its centralized control as long as application of the theory does 
not obstruct national policies; thus, the MNE's intercorporate ar-
rangements should be exempt from certain prohibitions imposed on 
independent corporations. 288 
It has been stated that "[w]here it is necessary to do so in order 
to do justice, the courts have not infrequently disregarded the sepa-
rate corporate entities and treated the two corporations as one."289 
A survey of the cases, however, reveals that courts are very reluctant 
to look behind the corporate entity without clear proof of evasion or 
fraud. It is in the area of corporate taxation that this principle faces 
its most severe test. 
2. Disregard of the Corporate Entity for Tax Purposes 
The income tax statutes in most countries contain express pro-
visions under which tax authorities may fully or partially disregard 
the separate existence of a corporation in a multicorporate structure 
if to do so is necessary to prevent tax avoidance or tax evasion.290 
In the absence of express statutory authority to the contrary, a corpo-
ration is generally treated as an independent entity for tax purposes. 
Nevertheless, courts are not blind to economic realities and will dis-
regard the corporate entity in order to defeat tax avoidance through 
286. See notes 301-29 infra and accompanying text for the protection of fiscal inter-
ests. 
287. See notes 348-68 infra and accompanying text for the protection of antitrust 
policies. 
288. See text accompanying notes 330-37 infra for the exemption of the MNE's in-
tercorporate arrangements from certain antitrust restrictions. 
289. California Zinc Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 591, 593 (Ct. Cl. 1947). 
290. See, e.g., INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 482. Statutes also provide for special cir-
cumstances under which taxpayers may elect to disregard a corporation for tax pur-
poses. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77, providing that the shareholders 
of certain small business corporations ("subchapter S corporations") may elect to dis-
regard the corporate entity for tax purposes and thereby be taxed on their pro rata 
share of the income, an approach similar to the tax treatment of a partnership. 
Other statutory provisions permit the entire economic enterprise to be treated as 
one taxable entity notwithstanding the number of individual corporate members. See, 
e.g., INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1501, providing that an "affiliated group of corporations" 
may elect to file a single consolidated return for the whole group (enterprise). The 
result is that the enterprise is taxed in accordance with its consolidated taxable income, 
which reflects the transactions with unrelated entities and tends to ignore the inter-
company dealings within the group. See Treas. Regs. § 1.1502-13 (1966). 
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the use of multiple corporations or in order to reach the real tax.-
payer in interest.291 Thus, under long-established tax principles, 
courts will refuse to recognize a corporation as a distinct entity if it 
lacks economic reality and is a sham.292 
Many cases in this area involve an artificial multicorporate struc-
ture formed principally for tax avoidance purposes. To distinguish 
between real and sham corporations, the courts have experimented 
with many tests including the "business activity" standard articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.293 Recognizing that a corporation might be organized for a 
variety of reasons, the Court stated that "so long as that purpose is 
the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying 
on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate 
taxable entity."294 A variant of the business activity standard is the 
tax avoidance doctrine, which, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, 
provides "that to be a separate jural person for purposes of taxation, 
a corporation must engage in some industrial, commercial, or other 
activity besides avoiding taxation."295 
The theories applied by the tax courts are analogous to the 
agency and enterprise theories applied to determine corporate lia-
bility in other settings.298 For example, the tax court has held that 
the entire income of sixteen alphabet corporations was taxable to 
the controlling corporation because "they carried on no separate 
independent income-producing activities [ and served no function 
other than avoiding taxes]. They were mere corporate shells acting 
as a conduit for [the controlling corporation]."297 Yet, in tax avoid-
ance cases the courts prefer to apply tax principles or statutory 
provisions that allow taxation according to the reality of the enter-
prise instead of formally disregarding the corporate entity. For in-
291. An entity may, for example, be treated as a corporation for tax purposes even 
though it does not satisfy the formal requirements of a corporation for other legal 
purposes. An early attempt to summarize the leading cases in the area was made by 
Judge Learned Hand in National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 467-68 (2d Cir. 
1944). 
292. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940). 
293. 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
294. 319 U.S. at 439. 
295. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d at 468. See generally B. BrrrKER 8: 
J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, §§ 1.05, 2.10, 15.07; 7 J. MERTINS, THE I.Aw OF FEDERAL IN• 
COME TAXATION §§ 38.07-.15 (1967, Supp. 1972); Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contri-
bution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968); Cleary, The Corporate 
Entity in Tax Cases, 1 TAX L. R.Ev. 3 (1945); Watts, Tax Problems of Regard for the 
Corporate Entity, in 20 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 867 (1962). 
296. See notes 252-89 supra and accompanying text. 
297. Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582, 603 (1959). 
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stance, the controlling corporation cannot escape taxation by antici-
patory attempts to divert income to another entity; income will be 
taxed to the party that earns it, and assignment of income will not 
be permitted.298 Under the long-standing judicial doctrine of sham 
transactions, transactions lacking economic substance and legal busi-
ness purpose will be ignored for tax purposes.299 Illustratively, when 
a parent sold portfolio stock at a loss to its wholly owned subsidiary 
-and yet retained economic control over the property for fifteen 
years following the sale, the court held that the sale was invalid for 
tax purposes.300 The court did not challenge the separate corporate 
entity of the subsidiary and ignored only the sham intercompany 
sale. Thus, under these and other doctrines, the taxing authority is 
able to look at the substance rather than the form of income-
producing activities without having expressly to disregard the cor-
porate entity. 
D. Application of the Corporate- Entity Concept 
to the Multinational Enterprise 
The foregoing legal principles that govern the recognition of 
the corporate entity are equally applicable to multinational business. 
Local courts may seek to reach the controlling corporation in a 
range of "exceptional cases" and for a variety of legal purposes. 
It is particularly in the tax and antitrust fields that national govern-
ments realize the importance of recognizing the entire economic unit 
of the MNE. 
I. Disregard of the Corporate Entity for 
International Tax Purposes 
a. An overview of possible abuses by the multinational enterprise 
through transfer prices. Tax revenues are an important economic 
benefit to the nations in which MNEs operate. Business operations 
of MNEs embrace many national tax jurisdictions resulting in 
multiple ta.x liabilities. Therefore, one of the major problems pre-
sented by the emergence of the MNE is the equitable allocation of 
298. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 3II U.S. 
ll2 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill, Il4-15 (1930); !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 269, 
482, 1551, 1561. 
299. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 
(1940); Griffith v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 
(1935); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 410 (2d Cir. 1957); National Investors Co. 
v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944). 
300. National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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its income-and its income taxes-among the participating states. 
The challenge to world tax systems is to promote the efficient opera-
tion of the MNE in a manner that will not distort the proper al-
location of resources by tax avoidance (underlap) or subject MNEs 
to double taxation (overlap).301 
This objective is made difficult because the MNE has the power 
to allocate its income and expenses among its corporate members 
around the world. The principal means by which this is accomplished 
is the intercompany (intraenterprise) transaction.302 Because such 
transactions are controlled by the same party in interest, the prices 
charged do not necessarily reflect the prices that would have been 
charged between the MNE and an unrelated business. The existence 
of this manipulative power has caused nation-states to monitor 
closely these allocation decisions. 
The most important type of intercompany transaction in the 
manufacturing and extractive industries is the intercompany sale of 
goods.303 "Intercompany sales are the single most important method 
effecting movement of capital between countries in which [ an MNE 
operates]."304 These include sales of finished and unfinished goods, 
components, equipment, and supplies between the parent company 
and its foreign subsidiaries, and between affiliates of the MNE. 
Assuming other relevant variables are constant, an MNE maxi-
mizes worldwide after-tax profitability by transferring its goods at 
a relatively low price to subsidiaries in nations that have relatively 
low corporate tax rates.305 Similarly, the MNE will maximize after-
tax profits if it buys goods at relatively high prices from its affiliates 
that are subject to comparatively low corporate tax rates. The price 
at which the MNE sells goods or services from one member of the 
enterprise to another is called the transfer price. Insofar as inter-
company sales and transfer prices determine the jurisdiction in which 
profits are taxed and the level of income produced, local tax author-
ities are concerned. As a result, tax authorities may challenge an 
301. C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 1, at 201. 
302. The term "intraenterprise transaction" is technically more accurate since not 
all of the components of the MNE are distinct corporate entities; nonetheless, the term 
"intercompany transaction" is commonly used in this context. The two terms will be 
used interchangeably throughout this Article and will refer to transactions between 
two corporations within the MNE, or between a corporation and a branch, or between 
two branches of the Mr>.TE. 
303. J. GREENE &: N. DUERR, lNTERCOMPANY TRANSACOONS IN THE MuLnNAnONAL 
FIRM 21 (1970) (survey by the National Industrial Conference Board) [hereinafter J. 
GREENE 8: N. DUERR]. 
304. D. ZENOFF 8: J. ZWICK, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 427-30 (1969) 
[hereinafter D. ZENOFF &: J. ZWICK]. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. 
305. D. ZENOFF &: J. ZWICK, supra note 304, at 427-30. 
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MNE's transfer prices and seek to substitute the price at which the 
goods would have been sold to outsiders.306 Although the potential 
abuses of intercompany sales have been recognized, empirical evi-
dence documenting the actual use of the transfer-price mechanism to 
shift profits between countries is vague and contradictory.307 
The propensity to use intercompany sales to allocate income may 
be dependent on the size of an enterprise. Thus, smaller firms may 
lack the international experience or be so decentralized that the 
coordination necessary to avoid taxes is Iacking.308 Medium-size 
firms, large enough to possess the requisite planning sophistication, 
are generally sufficiently centralized to develop the system necessary 
for such a tax avoidance strategy.309 While the incidence of inter-
company sales by these MNEs is not inconsequential, national gov-
ernments are understandably more concerned with the large MNEs 
that are economically more important than the other two groups}310 
A number of factors reveal that the large MNEs may not be able to 
engage in widespread effective use of intercompany sales to manipu-
late allocation of income. First, at some point the MNE becomes so 
large that effective coordination is impossible.311 It has already been 
noted that very large MNEs are decentralizing in order to retain the 
necessary sensitivity to localized markets;312 this same decentraliza-
tion makes it difficult to pursue any widespread policy of inter-
company sales to circumvent tax laws. Second, even if sophisticated 
managerial and financial tools would permit such a program, the 
MNE, with its substantial investment in the host country, has a 
strong incentive not to jeopardize its relationship with that country's 
government.313 Third, although :financial manipulation can result 
in large dollar saving-s, "such saving-s are small in relation to the 
earning-s received from capitalizing on [its] special strengths such 
as technical know-how, managerial and marketing expertise, or 
capacity to raise large sums of money."814 
306. J. GREENE & N. DuERR, supra note 303, at 21-24. 
307. See generally id. It has been suggested that the use of these manipulative de-
vices has been overestimated. Stobaugh, The Multinational Corporation: Measuring the 
Consequences, 6 CoLUM. J. WoRLD Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1971, at 59, 62 [hereinafter StobaughJ. 
These observations were based on the Harvard Business School Study of the MNE. 
308. See Stobaugh, supra note 307, at 59. 
309. See id. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. See text accompanying notes 113-17 supra. 
313. Stobaugh, supra note 307, at 62. 
314. Id. 
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b. The response of nation-states to tax avoidance schemes of 
the multinational enterprise. The attitude taken by nation-states 
through their legislatures and courts in the international context 
mirrors the diversity of techniques used in the domestic context. The 
experience of the United States and the United Kingdom are illus-
trative. The United States Tax Court has held that a foreign corpo-
ration that is merely a conduit could not avail itself of an otherwise 
applicable tax treaty,315 yet that same court refused to disregard the 
corporate entity of foreign subsidiaries that were found to be 
viable business entities-despite the fact that they were created in 
tax haven countries in order to reduce taxes.316 This partial disregard 
of the foreign entity could have been achieved under other tax 
principles, such as allocation of a portion of the subsidiary's income 
to the parent corporation. Such an allocation of the income of re-
lated corporations is possible under present statutory authority "in 
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income"317 
of each entity; taxable income will be determined as if the taxpayer 
had dealt with the other member of the enterprise at arm's length.318 
315. Aileen Indus. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971). The court held that in-
terest paid to a Honduras corporation by a United States corporation organized to col-
lect such interest on behalf of a Bahamian corporation, was not exempt from United 
States withholding tax under the United States-Honduras income tax treaty. See Jo• 
hansson v. United· States, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964), for an attempt by a Swedish 
individual to avail himself of the United States-Swiss tax treaty by organizing a Swiss 
corporation. 
316. In Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595 (1968), a controlled Swiss company was 
held to be a viable corporate entity notwithstanding the fact that it was organized to 
reduce taxes on oil income under the United States-Swiss tax treaty. In Johnson Bronze 
Co. v. Commissioner, 34 P-H TAX CT. REP.&: MEM. DEC. ~ 65,281 (Oct. 26, 1965), the 
court refused to include the income of a Panamanian selling subsidiary (an interme-
diate holding company) in the income of the United States parent corporation. The 
court upheld the subsidiary's existence as a separate taxable entity on the ground that 
it served a bona fide purpose by insulating the parent company from the various risks 
of foreign operation, despite the fact that all managerial and clerical work was per-
formed for it by the parent corporation, the subsidiary bad no employees, paid no 
salaries, owned no offices or office equipment, and had no warehouse. In Columbian 
Rope Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 793 (1964), the court held that undistributed income 
of a wholly owned Panamanian subsidiary created by a United States parent for valid 
business purposes was not includable in the parent's taxable income, citing /IIoline 
Properties as the basis for its decision. The taxable years in question were prior to the 
Revenue Act of 1962, which provided that certain types of income of controlled foreign 
corporations were to be included in the income of the United States parent in the year 
that the income was earned, even if the income was undistributed. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 
1954, §§ 951-64. 
317. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 482. Such a partial allocation of income was made in 
Johnson Bronze Co. v. Commissioner, 34 P-H TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEc. 11 65,281 (Oct. 
26, 1965), following the refusal of the court to disregard the corporate form of the for-
eign subsidiary or to attribute its whole income to the United States parent under the 
"assignment of income" doctrine. 
318. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(b}(l} (1968). 
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The English response to this problem has differed from the 
American approach. Early British tax decisions held that business 
carried on by subsidiaries incorporated in the United States was in 
fact carried on by English parent companies; the subsidiaries were 
viewed merely as agents of their English parents.319 Later cases 
established that mere ownership of a subsidiary did not assure that 
the subsidiary's business was in fact controlled in the United King-
dom. Thus, British courts will recognize the separate corporate 
entity of a subsidiary if its business is not in fact managed by the 
British parent company,320 unless it is revealed that the subsidiary 
is essentially an agent of the parent.321 
However, even if the foreign subsidiary is found to be a separate 
entity, British tax law will still tax the income of the subsidiary if 
it is a "resident" of the United Kingdom. Although a domestic 
corporation is defined under United States tax law as a corporation 
"created or organized in the United States or under the law of the 
United States or of any State or Territory,''322 British case law devel-
oped the theory that "a company resides for purposes of income tax 
where its real business is carried on . . . . And the real business is 
carried on where the central management and control actually 
abides."323 Obviously, the place of management and control does 
not necessarily coincide with the country of incorporation. This 
judicial test for determining tax residence is now articulated in the 
British tax statute.324 
Thus, under British law a company may be incorporated in the 
United Kingdom but avoid being a resident for tax purposes,325 and 
319. Apthorpe v. Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co., 4 Tax Cas. 41 (C.A. 1899); St. Louis 
Breweries, Ltd. v. Apthorpe, 4 Tax Cas. Ill (Q.B. 1898); United States Brewing Co. v. 
Apthorpe, 4 Tax Cas. 17 (Q.B. 1898); Frank Jones Brewing Co. v. Apthorpe, 4 Tax Cas. 
6 (Q.B. 1898). 
320. Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley, [1908] 2 K.B. 89 (C.A.); Kodak, Ltd. 
v. Clark, [1903] I K.B. 505. 
321. See Unit Constr. Co. v. Bullock, [1960] 38 T.C. 712. 
322. INT. REv CODE OF 1954, § 770l(a)(4). The place of incorporation is also provided 
by the United States tax treaties as the criterion for citizenship of United States cor-
porations. See, e.g., Treaty with Germany on Double Taxation of Income, July 22, 1954, 
art. Il(l)(e), [1954] 3 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133 (effective Dec. 20, 1954). 
323. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455, 458 (H.L.). 
324. Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1970, c. 10, § 482(7). See also Israeli In-
come Tax Ordinance § I. 
325. Egyptian Delta Land & Inv. Co. v. Todd, [1929] A.C. I (H.L.). However, the 
United Kingdom Treasury is protected against migration of the corporate management 
abroad by a statutory provision making it illegal to move without government consent. 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1970, c. IO, § 482. 
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a company incorporated abroad may be subject to British taxes.326 
Generally speaking, if a company's business is controlled by its direc-
tors, that business will be considered to be carried on where the 
board of directors meets. If the directors of the subsidiary meet 
abroad and manage and control its business there, it will not be a 
resident of the United Kingdom; but, if the subsidiary's business is 
in fact managed and controlled by the board of directors of the 
parent company in the United Kingdom, the subsidiary will also be 
a resident of the United Kingdom for tax purposes.327 
The foregoing tax cases reveal that, while the domestic concepts 
of the corporate entity apply to MNEs, additional principles sensitive 
to the peculiarities of international business have also evolved to 
cope with controlled corporations. Such principles are not necessarily 
incompatible with recognition of the separate legal personality of 
each related entity, but they do protect the national interests in 
financial integrity by looking through corporate form in order to 
reach the economic essence of the enterprise. Thus, the British ascer-
tain the locus of "control" and "management" as the determinative 
factor of tax liability, and thereby reach certain enterprises that 
might escape American tax. The United States moved to protect its 
financial interest in 1962 by amending the Internal Revenue Code 
to provide that income earned by American-controlled tax haven 
companies would be taxed to American stockholders in the year 
earned, rather than postponing taxation until remittance of income 
to the United States.328 In addition, the United States has vigorously 
enforced its statutory authorization, by reallocation of income among 
related entities, to prevent manipulation of income.329 
This brief survey of the responses by two countries to the tax 
problems caused by the MNE demonstrates the desperate attempt 
being made by nation-states to thwart tax avoidance. The law in this 
area remains uncertain as countries continue the search for a satis-
factory regulatory scheme. 
326. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455 (HL.). 
In a particular instance, a company may be found to be a resident of more than one 
country if its management and control are so divided. See Swedish Cent. Ry. , .. Thomp• 
son, [1925] A.C. 495 (H.L.). 
327. Unit Constr. Co. v. Bullock, [1960] A.C. 351 (H.L.) (subsidiaries incorporated 
in Kenya were held to be residents of the United Kingdom). 
328. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64. See Tillinghast, United States Income Taxa• 
tion of Foreign Source Income: A Survey of the Provisions and Problems, in 29 N.Y.U. 
INST. FED. TAX 1 (1971). See text accompanying notes 175-77 supra. 
329. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 482. A somewhat similar provision of the British 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 19'70, c. 10, § 485, has not been vigorously en• 
forced. 
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2. The Corporate Entity as a Limitation 
on Antitrust Regulation 
785 
a. Intercorporate arrangements. The interconnected corporate 
network of the MNE provides interesting conceptual and practical 
problems in the restrictive practices and antitrust field. It is in this 
area that the clash between the form of business enterprise and the 
underlying economic unity is clearest. When recently presented with 
a territorial division agreement between a foreign parent company 
and its wholly owned subsidiaries in different member states, which 
probably would have violated the antitrust provisions of the EEC 
Treaty agreement if it had been between unrelated companies, the 
Commission of the European Common Market nevertheless approved 
it.830 The Commission viewed the MNE as a single economic entity 
despite the separate legal entities used to conduct its business.331 Em-
phasizing the control by the parent,332 the Commission concluded 
that "[u]nder these circumstances, it cannot be expected that one part 
of this entity--even though it has a separate legal personality-will 
compete with the parent company."333 
Last year, the EEC Commission applied the same theory to other 
MNEs such as the American-based Eastman Kodak Company.334 The 
Commission held: 
'Where the subsidiaries concerned, as in this case, depend exclu-
sively and completely on their parent company and where this parent 
330. Christiani & Nielsen N.V., 12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/ 12 (1969), [1965-1969 New Devel-
opments Transfer Binder] CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 1f 9308 ijune 18, 1969). The decision 
involved a Danish-based MNE with wholly owned subsidiaries in several EEC countries. 
331. The Commission was aware of the economic attributes of the MNE and the 
presence of this new business form of conducting transnational business. It stated: 
For reasons of management, this enterprise, whose activities are international, 
formed subsidiaries in various countries rather than establish branches or agencies. 
What is involved here is an element of market strategy that does not result in the 
conclusion that, in this case, a wholly-owned subsidiary is an economic entity that 
can compete with its parent company. 
12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/at 14, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH Cow.r. 
MKT. REP. CJ 9308, at 8659. 
332. Furthermore, Christiani & Nielsen, Copenhagen, has a right to appoint the 
managers of Christiani & Nielsen, The Hague, and to give its subsidiary instruc-
tions that it must follow. Christiani & Nielsen, The Hague, is therefore an integral 
part of the economic whole of Christiani & Nielsen group. 
The division of markets provided for in the agreement fbetween the parent and 
the subsidiary] is, therefore, only a divfaion of labor within the same economic 
entity. 
12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/at 14, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH Cow.r. 
MKT. REP. CJ 9308, at 8659. 
333. 12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/at 14, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH 
CoMM. MKT. REP. CJ 9308, at 8659. 
334. 13 E.E.C. J.O. L147/24, [New Developments] 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. CJ 9378 
(July 2, 1972). 
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company effectively exercises its power of supervision by giving exact 
instructions, it is impossible for the subsidiaries to act independently 
of each other in the areas which the parent company controls.835 
Accordingly, when the MNE affiliates in fact constitute a single eco-
nomic entity, intra-MNE arrangements do not violate the EEC law 
as long as they do not involve restrictive arrangements with unrelated 
third parties.836 But, MNEs that decentralize their marketing deci-
sions and, despite the legal control over the subsidiaries, do not in-
struct affiliates as to marketing and pricing behavior, might still be 
subject to the antitrust laws in their intercorporate dealings; the 
reason for such a distinction is that such affiliates might be viewed 
and expected to act as competitors.337 
Whether the United States would apply this single enterprise 
theory is highly questionable. Various statements by the courts reveal 
a preoccupation with corporate form. In a recent illustrative case, 
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,338 a parent 
corporation and its subsidiaries were charged with restraints of trade. 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that all the 
parties were part of a "single business entity"339 and therefore no 
conspiracy existed as a matter of law. Citing its earlier decision in 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,340 the Supreme Court 
reversed and held that 
since respondents Midas and International [the subsidiary and the 
parent] availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through 
separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save 
them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate 
entities.341 
In Timken, the Court had announced that "[t]he fact that there is 
common ownership or control of the contracting corporations does 
335. 13 E.E.C. J.O. Ll47/at 25, [New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 
11 9378, at 8819. 
336. Therefore, the sales conditions agreed upon between Kodak companies and 
their various buyers did not come within the scope of the antitrust provisions of Article 
85 of the EEC Treaty. 13 E.E.C. J.O. LI47 /at 24-25, [New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM. 
MKT. REP. 11 9378, at 8819-20. 
337. For the EEC policy in this context, see generally Dietz, Enforcement of Anti-
Trust Laws in the EEC, 6 INTL. LAw. 742 (1972); Forcione, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy 
Under the Antitrust Regulations of the Common Market, 25 Bus. LAW. 1419 (1972). 
338. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
339. 376 F.2d 629, 699 (7th Cir. 196'7). 
340. 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
341. 392 U.S. at 141-42. 
March 1973] Private .Multinational Enterprise 787 
not liberate them from the impact of antitrust laws."342 A distinction 
the Court had failed to recognize was that Perma Life involved in 
reality a single business entity whereas Timken concerned an inter-
national joint-venture.343 
It is submitted that enforcement agencies and courts should rec-
ognize that the various components of an 11NE cannot be expected 
to behave as if they were unrelated. The separate corporate personal-
ity of each unit of the MNE should not be determinative if in a 
business and economic sense the entities act as a unified enterprise; 
to treat an MNE differently depending on whether its business is 
conducted through incorporated or unincorporated units344 is an 
unjustified deference to form over substance.345 It is unrealistic to 
expect--or require-wholly owned affiliates to compete with each 
other as unrelated companies.346 This is particularly true when the 
motivation for incorporation serves a valid commercial purpose, such 
as compliance with foreign law requiring local incorporation, a 
342. Ml U.S. at 598. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 
340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947). 
343. The court of appeals indicated that Perma Life's affiliates did not hold them-
selves out as competitors but rather as related members of the same enterprise. 376 
F.2d at 699. This is an important point since related corporations that hold themselves 
out as competitors should be subject to the antitrust rules in their intercorporate deal-
ings. Kiefer-Stewart involved such a factual arrangement. Perma Life was decided on the 
pleadings, and at any rate the decision could be justified on antitrust theories other 
than the intraenterprise restrictive arrangements. See 392 U.S. at 142. 
344. The United States-based Timken Company acquired complete ownership of its 
foreign subsidiaries and converted them into unincorporated divisions. At that stage the 
United States Department of Justice approved Timken's intracorporate business ar-
rangements. Markley, How Timken Coordinates Its Worldwide Manufacturing and 
Marketing, EXPORT TRADE, April 25, 1960, at 10. A change of attitude by the Justice 
Department concerning the arrangements between wholly owned subsidiaries and their 
companies would be advisable, as long as these entities behave like members of a single 
enterprise, since they in fact all belong to the same MNE. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 
v. Hawaii Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 
(1970). 
345. As Justice Jackson correctly noted in his dissent in Timken at 341 U.S. at 606: 
It is admitted that if Timken had, within its own corporate organization, set up 
separate departments to operate plants in France and Great Britain, as well as in 
the United States, "that would not be a conspiracy. You must have two entities 
to have a conspiracy." Thus, although a single American producer, of course, would 
not compete with itself, either abroad or at home, and could determine prices and 
allot territories with the same effect as here, that would not be a violation of the 
Act because a corporation cannot conspire with itself .... The doctrine now 
applied to foreign commerce is that foreign subsidiaries organized by an American 
corporation are "separate persons," and any arrangement between them and the 
parent corporation to do that which is legal for the parent alone is an unlawful 
conspiracy. I think that result places too much weight on labels. 
346. ANTITRUST I.Aws, supra note 178, at 36 (1955). 
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managerial decision to reduce risk, or compliance with particular tax 
regulations. As The Attorney General's National Committee To 
Study the Antitrust Laws admitted in 1955-only four years after 
Timken: 
The use of subsidiaries is generally induced by normal, prudent 
business considerations. No social objective would be attained were 
subsidiaries enjoined from agreeing not to compete with each other 
or with their parent. To demand internal competition within and 
between the members of a single business unit is to invite chaos with-
out promotion of the public welfare.347 
b. Antitrust jurisdiction over the multinational enterprise. Al-
though the United States has not applied the enterprise theory to 
e:xempt an MNE from the substantive reach of the antitrust laws, it 
has applied an analogous theory to subject the parent company of the 
MNE to local jurisdiction despite the fact that the anticompetitive 
activities were arranged in the home country and in fact only carried 
on by the foreign entities of the MNE. Until recently, the United 
States was the only country to apply this so-called "effect" theory, 
under which it has been able to apply American law to the activities 
abroad of foreign companies. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America/148 the famous Alcoa case, Judge Learned Hand asserted that 
it is "settled law ... that any State may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders 
347. Id. at 34. See, e.g., United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 
,r 69,619 (N.D. Okla. 1960); Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty. 
First Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 182 (1969); Willis &: Pitofsky, Anti-
trust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 20 (1968). See 
also Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); Allan Ready Mix 
Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) ,r 73,955 
(D.C. Tenn. April 13, 1972). But see Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J.A. Buchroeder 
&: Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966). 
Wilbur Fugate, Chief Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, United States 
Department of Justice, stated recently that Timken is still good law but that the recom-
mendations of the 1955 Attorney General's Committee should be followed in regard to 
wholly owned foreign subsidiaries of United States MNEs and activities based on cor-
porate control, but not to those based on contractual agreements. Remarks at the Mul-
tinational Enterprise Seminar of the World Trade Institute, New York, Oct. 25, 1972, 
5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 50,152, at 55.,258-59. He concluded that 
[u]nder present U.S. antitrust law, a U.S. company may usually exercise its control 
over a foreign subsidiary to direct the subsidiary in matters of pricing and sales 
areas. The antitrust laws, however, may apply to intra-corporate dealings where 
third parties are injured or monopolization is present. 
Id. at 55,262. The EEC Commission gave its negative clearance to an intra-MNE express 
agreement not to compete in Christiani &: Nielsen N.V., 12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/12 (1969). 
See notes 330-33 supra and accompanying text. 
l!48. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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that has consequences within its borders which the State repre-
hends .... "349 Although the full reach of this theory is uncertain, 
the United States courts have applied this theory whenever the for-
eign corporation intended to affect United States commerce and such 
adverse effect has occurred.3M 
Although American law has not been specifically addressed to 
MNEs, most cases involving extraterritorial application of the United 
States antitrust law have dealt with restrictive activities conducted 
abroad by foreign companies that were affiliated with local corpora-
tions. For example, United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland 
Information Center, Inc.351 dealt with concerted anticompetitive 
conduct abroad by Swiss parent companies that controlled their 
United States subsidiaries. Even the Alcoa case involved related for-
eign and American corporations.352 However, the United States 
courts have not expressly invoked the enterprise theory to hold for-
eign companies liable for antitrust violations for the actions of their 
local affiliates or vice versa. Instead, they have proceeded on the basis 
of the effect of the foreign restrictive activities on domestic competi-
tion.353 
349. 148 F.2d at 443. The controversy that has raged ever since this decision sug-
gests that the law is hardly "settled." See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT 
OF THE FIFI'Y-FIRST CONFERENCE 304-592 (1964), esp. Riedweg, The Extra-Territorial 
Application of Restrictive Trade Legislation-Jurisdiction and International Law, id. 
at 357, Oliver, The Harmonization of Laws and the Development of Principles for the 
Resolution of Conflicts of Enforcement Jurisdiction, id. at 511; COMMON MARKET AND 
AMERICAN ANTITRUST 364-416 (J. Rahl ed. 1970) [hereinafter J. Rahl]. 
350. J. Rahl, supra note 349, at 86. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965) adopted, with several modifications, the "effect" 
theory as a basis for substantive international jurisdiction. 
351. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1J 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962), order 
modified, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 1J 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1965). 
352. The foreign company "Limited" was organized in Canada to take over the 
properties of the United States "Alcoa" that were located abroad, Limited issued all its 
common stock to Alcoa's common shareholders. 148 F .2d at 439. There were several 
indications that Limited and Alcoa did not deal with each other at arm's length and 
that Alcoa took part in the formation of "Alliance,'' the foreign cartel in question. 
148 F.2d at 440. One commentator s~ested that Judge Hand's effect theory was an 
attempt "to reverse, on grounds of law, a result below which he found unpalatable but 
did not want to remand for lengthy retrial on the facts." K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND 
AMERICAN BUSINESS A.BROAD 72 (1958). The questionable point of fact was whether 
Alcoa actually did participate in the foreign cartel; the lower court had found that 
Alcoa had not. In addition to the element of common control and the fact that Alcoa 
and Limited were affiliated companies, Limited's international headquarters was in 
New York, not Canada. Id. at 73. 
353. Thus, in the noted Watchmakers case the court applied the effect theory stat-
ing that "a United States court may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and contracts, if, 
as in the case at bar, such acts and contracts have a substantial and material effect 
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By contrast, the EEC Court of Justice, in the landmark Dyestuff 
decisions,354 invoked the enterprise theory in order to subject foreign-
based MNEs to its jurisdiction. The Commission in this case355 had 
fined the Swiss companies-Ciba, Geigy, and Sandoz-and the British 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), along with some EEC companies 
because of the concerted price-fixing of dyestuffs within the Common 
Market. The Court of Justice upheld the Commission on the appli-
cability of the EEC antitrust law to the foreign companies. The Com-
mission and the court fined the foreign parent companies, rather than 
their Common Market subsidiaries that were the distributors of 
dyestuffs within the European Community and had formally per-
formed the anticompetitive activities. 
ICI contended vigorously that it had not performed these activi-
ties; ICI asserted that they were performed by its EEC subsidiaries. 
The court properly rejected this contention because of facts that 
revealed a highly controlled multinational corporate structure. The 
court stated: 
The fact that the subsidiary [of ICI] has its own legal personality 
does not serve to rule out the possibility that its conduct is attrib-
utable to the parent company. This could be the case where the 
subsidiary, even though it has its own legal personality, does not in-
dependently determine its own market behavior but essentially fol-
lows the instructions given it by the parent company [ICI]. If the 
subsidiary does not in fact have autonomy in determining its course 
upon our foreign and domestic commerce." 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas,) 
,J 70,600, at 77,457. In the same litigation, eight years earlier, the district court had held 
that the Swiss parent companies were present in the United States for service of process 
purposes through the activities of their joint American subsidiaries. 113 F. Supp. 40, 
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
354. Separate decisions relating to nine companies were released together. Imperial 
Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH COMM. 
MKT. REP. tj[ 8161 Guly 14, 1972); Badische Anilin-und Soda-Fabrik AG v. Commission 
of the European Communities, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8162 Guly 14, 1972); Farben-
fabriken Bayer AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. 
REP. tj[ 8163 Guly 14, 1972); J.R. Geigy v. Commission of the European Communities, 
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8164 Guly 14, 1972); Sandoz AG v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8165 Guly 14, 1972); S.A. Fran~ise des 
matieres colorantes v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. 
REP. ,i 8166 Guly 14, 1972); Casella Farbwerke Mainkur AG v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. tj[ 8167 (July 14, 1972); Farbwerke Hoechst 
v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. tj[ 8168 Guly 14, 
1972); Azienda Colori Nazionali v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH 
CoMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8169 Guly 14, 1972). 
In reference to the jurisdictional issue, the cases are basically the same; thus specific 
citations will be given only to the ICI case. 
355. 12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll95/ll (1969), CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,I 9314 Guly 24, 1969). 
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of conduct on the market, the prohibition of Article 85, paragraph I 
[of the EEC Treaty], is inapplicable to the relationship between it 
and the parent cbmpany with which it forms an economic unity. 
Since an affiliated group, so structured forms a unity, the parent com-
pany can, under certain circumstances, be held responsible for the 
actions of the subsidiary.arm 
The parent company had both the legal control over the sub-
sidiaries and the effective organizational control over certain activi-
ties of the subsidiaries.357 The decision-making power with respect to 
the pertinent conduct of the subsidiaries was centralized at the 
parent's level and had not been delegated: "The plaintiff [ICI] could 
decisively influence the pricing policy of its subsidiaries in the Com-
mon Market and it did in fact make use of this power to give instruc-
tions on the occasion of the three price increases in question here."358 
Accordingly, the illegal conduct within the Common Market was 
viewed as conduct of the enterprise as a whole--conduct of a single 
economic unit consisting of both the parent company and the sub-
sidiary, which were recognized as distinct legal entities-and attrib-
uted to the parent that originated the conduct.359 
The court looked at the entire corporate network of the MNE to 
determine where the authority to make the pertinent pricing policy 
decisions resided. Once it was established that this power lay with 
the parent company and that "[b ]y availing itself of its power of 
direction over its subsidiaries established in the Common Market, 
plaintiff [the parent ICI] was able to apply its decisions on that [EEC] 
market,"360 it followed that the prohibited practices were therefore 
356. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 8161, at 8031 (emphasis added). 
357. See text accompanying notes 152-60 supra for these two dimensions of con-
trol. 
358. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 8161, at 8031. 
359. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 1J 8161, at 8031. The British govern-
ment protested the Commission's original assertion of jurisdiction stating: 
[T]he separate legal personalities of a parent company and its subsidiary should be 
respected. Such concepts as "enterprise entity" when applied for the purpose of 
asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent company by reason of the 
presence within the jurisdiction of a subsidiary (and a foreign subsidiary by 
reason of the presence of its parent company) are contrary to sound legal princi-
ple in that they disregard the distinction of personality between parent and 
subsidiary. 
Statement of Principles According To Which, in the View of the United Kingdom 
Government, Jurisdiction May Be Exercised over Foreign Corporations in Anti-trust 
Matters, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AssoCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFI'Y·FOURTH CONFERENCE 
184 (1970). 
360. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH COMM, MKT. REP. 11 8161, at 8031. 
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"carried out directly within the Common Market"361 by the parent 
ICI. As a result, the court flatly rejected the plea of lack of EEC 
jurisdiction raised by ICI.362 The EEC thus recognized, for antitrust 
purposes, the local business operation of ICI as an integral part of 
the larger enterprise controlled abroad. The court employed the 
enterprise theory363 to attribute the acts of the subsidiaries to the 
controlling corporation of the enterprise-the parent company. 
By invoking the enterprise theory, the court held that the activi-
ties of the foreign parent company were carried out within and not 
outside the Common Market. In so holding, the court avoided the 
discussion of the controversial effect theory, namely, whether actions 
performed outside the EEC by foreign companies are subject to EEC 
jurisdiction solely because these actions had effects within the Com-
mon Market. Accordingly, the court did not have to respond to the 
lengthy arguments by ICI, supported by the expert opinion of Pro-
fessor Jennings, that basing jurisdiction solely on the effect theory is 
contrary to international law.364 It is submitted that the court rightly 
rejected the contention that ICI could not be considered as having 
acted ·within the EEC through the activities of its subsidiaries in the 
Community.365 It is true that not every activity of wholly controlled 
subsidiaries may be imputed to the parent; but, notwithstanding the 
separate legal personalities of the subsidiaries, activities that the 
evidence reveals were in fact performed according to the instructions 
of the parent may be attributed to the parent under the enterprise 
theory.aoo 
The court's decision is consistent with earlier Commission deci-
sions that the antitrust prohibitions are not applicable to the rela-
361. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8161, at 8031. 
362. 15 E.E.C. J.0. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 8161, at 8031. 
363. See notes 265-89 supra and accompanying text. 
364. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,J 8161, at 8005-06. 
365. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,J 8161, at 8005-06. The effect theory 
should be considered primarily in cases involving foreign companies without local 
affiliates, or when the members of the MNE do not actually comprise a single economic 
unit with respect to the activities under consideration. However, most cases have 
involved local members of MNEs in a highly controlled structure. See notes 351-53 
supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the enterprise theory may be properly ap-
plied to their activities. 
366. See notes 270-71 supra and accompanying text. As the Commission put it before 
the court: "The thing to be determined here is that as to the practices involved here 
plaintiff's subsidiaries were mere tools, so that in competitive relations with third 
parties they appear to be an extension of I.C.I. in the Common Market." 15 E.E.C, 
J.0. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,J 8161, at 8007, 
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tions between the parent of the MNE and its subsidiaries as long as 
they in fact comprise a single economic enterprise.367 "Thus if the 
affiliated-group relationship can have favorable effects for enterprises 
in the application of Community cartel law, it would also have to be 
recognized that this relationship can also have unfavorable effects."368 
E. New Legal Models 
The uncertainty generated by judicial and legislative attempts to 
recognize the underlying economic unit of a multicorporate firm and 
to prevent frustration of national policies has led governments and 
international businesses to seek a more satisfactory legal framework 
around which MNEs may be constructed. Two recent developments 
have great relevance to this problem: the West German Law of Re-
lated Companies, and the proposals for a European company law. 
I. The German Law of Related Companies 
Passed in 1965, the German Law of Related Companies, the Kon-
zernrecht,369 is a regulatory scheme that preserves the concept of the 
enterprise as a network of multiple legal entities within a single 
managerial framework. Nevertheless, the law is a good example of 
the needed shift in emphasis from the corporate form to the under-
lying economic enterprise. Like the MNE, the German Konzem is an 
economic unit consisting of a group of companies, related by ties of 
control extending into the separate legal entities. Whether the law 
will be applied to a particular enterprise depends upon actual or 
contractual control. Control may therefore be maintained, for ex-
ample, by a majority of votes370 or by a contractual relationship by 
which an A.G. subordinates its managerial functions to the direction 
of another company or undertakes to transfer its total profits to an-
other (the controlling) company. 
Under this law, a Konzern is formed if a controlling and one or 
more controlled business units are subject to the centralized manage-
ment of the controlling unit,371 or if legal entities are subject to 
367. See notes 330-33 supra and accompanying text, 
368. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1f 8161, at 80ll (referring to de-
fendant's rejoinder). 
369. AKTG (1965). See text accompanying notes 194-99 supra for a discussion of two-
tiered management under the AKTG. 
370. AKTG § 16 (1965). 
871. AKTG § 18(1) (1965). 
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centralized management even though one does not control the 
other.372 The Konzern thus includes (1) companies that are parties to 
a control agreement,373 under which separate companies agree in 
advance to be subject to the management of another-the controlling 
-company,374 and (2) integrated companies.3711 Integrated companies 
stand in a closer corporate relationship, even though there is no full 
merger eliminating the separate legal personalities of the companies. 
Instead, the integrated companies preserve their distinct juristic 
identities, although they constitute a single economic unit. Such in-
tegration becomes effective when a resolution to integrate into the 
German parent is passed by the shareholders of its wholly owned 
subsidiary and is approved by the shareholders of the parent.376 
When there is a control agreement or a wholly owned integrated 
subsidiary, the law recognizes the power of the controlling company 
to direct the controlled companies, which may include instructions 
that result in particularized decisions that are detrimental to the 
latter, and permits the exercise of such power as long as directives 
are beneficial to the controlling entity or to the group of related 
companies (enterprise or Konzern) as a whole.377 However, the direc-
tors and officers of the controlling company may be liable for breach 
of the duty of due care in managing the controlled company.378 Thus, 
the Konzernrecht correctly perceives the shift of decision-making 
power from the controlled to the controlling entity pursuant to the 
control agreement or integration.379 Such a shift properly charac-
terizes the decision-making process of many MNEs in important 
business determinations.380 
The rationale of the law is to protect the shareholders of the 
controlled companies of the enterprise, as well as outsiders who do 
business with or otherwise invest in one of the enterprise's units.381 
372. AKTG § 18(2) (1965). 
373. AKTG §§ 18(1), 291 (1965). 
374. AKTG § 291(1) (1965). A control agreement is but one type of "enterprise 
agreement" regulated by the Act. See AKTG §§ 291-92 (1965). 
375. AKTG §§ 18(1), 319 (1965). 
376. AKTG §§ 319(1)-(2) (1965). Such an integration is recorded in the Commercial 
Register. AKTG §§ 319(3)-(4) (1965). 
377. AKTG §§ 308, 323 (1965). 
378. AKTG §§ 309-10, 323 (1965). 
379. See AKTG § 308 (1965). 
380. See text accompanying notes 119-21 supra. 
381. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 105-07. 
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Thus, notwithstanding the fiction of the corporate veil, the control-
ling company may be liable to the controlled company's creditors or 
minority shareholders. The liabilities imposed depend on the type of 
control and whether there is a control agreement. Disregarding the 
corporate form, the law protects the minority shareholders and cre-
ditors from impairment of the controlled company's capital and pro-
fits.382 Indeed, the law goes even further by imposing liability upon 
the controlling entity for losses sustained by the controlled company 
in certain circumstances.383 
Where there is no control agreement or integration, a company 
which in effect controls another company, through stock ownership 
or otherwise, may not cause the controlled company to act or to re-
frain from acting to its disadvantage without compensation.384 Absent 
a control agreement or an integration, the law forces the affiliated 
companies to behave like unrelated companies. The law protects a 
controlled company against exploitation of its resources without ad-
equate compensation, and requires extensive disclosures by the con-
trolling company.385 The law requires dissemination of relevant 
financial information to the shareholders and the public, particularly 
with respect to intercompany transactions within the group of related 
companies.386 
The increased emphasis on disclosure of information is further 
reflected by requirements imposed on entities whenever they acquire 
more than twenty-five per cent of all the shares of a German stock 
company. A business owning this requisite percentage must notify 
the issuer of this fact in writing; the investing entity must also notify 
the public if it acquires a majority interest or if its investment falls 
below the earlier reported quantum.387 These disclosure require-
ments are intended to protect shareholders, and failure to comply 
382. See, e.g., AKTG §§ 302, 309-10, 322(i) (1965). 
383. AKTG §§ 300-03, 324 (1965). In addition, a control agreement or an agreement to 
transfer profits must provide for fair compensation to, and for an offer to acquire the 
shares for adequate consideration from, the minority shareholders of the controlled 
company. AKTG §§ 304-05 (1965). 
384. AKTG § 311 (1965). 
385. AKTG §§ 311, 312-15, 31'7-18 (1965). 
386. AKTG § 312 (1965). See AKTG § 329 (1965) requiring consolidated financial state-
ments and annual business reports of integrated companies or companies subject to a 
control agreement. See generally E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 105; Haskell, The New 
West German Law of "Related Business Units", 24 Bus. I.Aw. 421 (1969); ICC 263, supra 
note 166, at 36-37. 
387. AKTG §§ 20-21 (1965). 
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results in severe consequences: the controlling shareholder's rights 
in the issuer company are suspended.388 These disclosure require-
ments apply to any MNE that holds the requisite percentage of shares 
of a German stock company.389 
Beyond the disclosure requirements, the substantive rules of re-
lated entities may also be relevant to the MNE. Of course, the MNE 
is affected by German law to the extent that an MNE's operations 
in Germany involve a group of companies related because of stock 
ownership. But, when a non-German company is a party to a contract 
of control with a German stock company, it has been suggested that 
the Konzernrecht may be applied since the German company is sub-
ject to the direction of a related (although in this instance foreign) 
company.390 Such a situation raises very interesting questions since 
when this control agreement is present, the very dangers of subvert-
ing the interests of the subsidiary in favor of the controlling entity-
concerns that prompted the passage of the Konzernrecht--exist. Will 
the German law permit the subsidiaries to comply with directives 
from an American parent corporation, which is required by the 
United States government to comply ·with American economic regu-
lations and policies, under the theory that it promotes the interest 
of the MNE as a whole? Will, for example, German law recognize 
the attempted extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws 
or prohibitions against trading with an enemy of the United States? 
Perhaps the Germans will carefully balance the interests of the sub-
sidiary, its shareholders, and creditors with the economic conse-
quences to the MNE of noncompliance with American laws.391 But, in 
Fruehauf v. Massardy,892 a French court took into account only the 
interests of the French subsidiary and compelled it to fulfill a con-
tract although the subsidiary had been ordered not to do so by its 
American parent. The conflict arose in circumstances not unlike the 
388. AKTG §§ 20·21 (1965). 
389. AKTG §§ 20-21 (1965). H. KOPPENSTEINER, INTERNATIONAL UNTERNEHMEN DEllT• 
SCHEN GESSELSCHAFl'SRECHT 285 (1971) [hereinafter H. KOPPENSTEINER]. There are other 
general rules concerning related companies, such as the limitations imposed by AKTG 
§§ 56, 71 (1965) on the acquisition of shares by a controlled company as a means of 
guaranteeing that an entity does not acquire its own shares, and the voting rights 
provisions of .AKTG § 136 (1965), but they appear to apply only to German companies. 
See H. KOPPENSTEINER, supra, at 286, 291. 
390. H. KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 389, at 309-21. 
391. Id. at 319; Rehbinder, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A Euro-
pean Legal Point of View, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 95 (1969) [hereinafter Rehbinder]. 
~92. [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, [1965] J.C.P. II 14,274 bis (Cour d'appel Paris). 
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above hypothetical questions: The French subsidiary was supplying 
products to Red China-acts permitted under French law but counter 
to American regulations under the Trading with the Enemy Act.393 
This sensitive area of conflicting national policies and the reach 
of economic regulatory controls of nation-states is particularly appro-
priate for intergovernmental cooperation and resolution. The prem-
ise of the Konzernrecht, that the needs of the business enterprise 
must be balanced with the protection required by creditors and 
minority stockholders of the subsidiary, may serve as the underlying 
rationale of an international agreement. Thus, reasonable limitations 
could be placed on the nature and scope of a parent's directives, or a 
method of compensation for affected groups in the host country could 
be designed for those occasions when the interests of the subsidiary 
and the MNE do not coincide. 
The issues raised by German-based MNEs are less difficult; it has 
been suggested that most of the specific provisions directed toward 
related entities will not be applicable because foreign subsidiaries-
not German subsidiaries-will be affected by the actions of German-
based MNEs.394 Whether the interests of those subsidiaries will be 
protected in other countries will depend on the internal laws of those 
other countries, including, for example, such doctrines as fiduciary 
duties and liabilities of majority stockholders under American case 
law. 
2. The Proposals for a European Company Law 
A notable attempt to recognize the multinational commercial 
enterprise as a single legal entity in a regional context is the 
393. In reaching its decision to appoint a temporary administrator to perform the 
contract, the court emphasized that the contract was with an exporter who, under 
French law, would have been able to recover treble damages for the breach of contract 
against Fruehauf-France, putting it out of business and destroying 600 jobs in the 
process. The contract was performed and the subsidiary was returned to its owners. 
The court did not base its decision on public or private international law; nor did it 
find that the United States had exceeded its jurisdiction in applying its Trading with 
the Enemy Act; nor did it attempt to evaluate the American interests vis-a-vis the 
French interests in relation to the issues at stake. Apparently the decision was solely 
based on concepts of French corporation law. See Craig, Application of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on 
Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REv. 579 (1970). 
Compare Fruehauf with Judgment of Dec. 21, 1960, 34 BGHZ 169, in which the 
German Federal Court held the American embargo policy to be in concurrence with 
West German policy. See Rehbinder, supra note 391, at 111. 
~!){, :fl. 1\-0PPENSTEINER, supra note 389, at 26(;, 
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"European Company" concept. Proposals for a supranational com-
pany law in Europe have been under consideration by the EEC as a 
means to encourage the extension of companies across national 
borders. It appears to be in the common interest of all members of 
the EEC to facilitate the growth of business operations on a larger 
and more efficient scale than has been possible to date under the 
operation of nation-based company laws.895 In March 1965, France 
submitted a memorandum to the EEC Commission suggesting the 
creation of commercial companies on a European scale.896 One year 
later, the EEC published a memorandum describing three alterna-
tives that would give impetus to the creation of such companies: 
harmonization of the corporate laws of the EEC member nations; a 
uniform European company law to be introduced in all EEC member 
nations separately; and, a convention allowing establishment of such 
companies under a supranational law.897 
The EEC invited Professor Sanders of Rotterdam to draft a 
statute embodying the third alternative. Although the draft,898 deal-
ing solely with company law and not with the laws of related fields 
such as taxation, was finished late in 1966, it was not until June 1970, 
that the Commission submitted the proposed Law for European 
Companies to the Council of Ministers; the draft submitted con-
tained the Commission's refinement of the Sanders draft, including 
rules of tax law.899 The current proposal is by no means final, and 
395. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 364-87; EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AssoCIATION, 
COMPANY LAW 13-17 (1970) [hereinafter COMPANY LAw]; EEC Commission Memo, No. 
P-1/66, Concentration of Enterprises in the Common Market, [1965-1969 New Develop-
ments Transfer Binder] CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9081 (Jan. 1966). See also EEC 
Commission Press Release No. I.P. (70) 148, U.S. Investments in the EEC, Aug. 18, 
1970, &: Paper from documentation europeene 1970, Serie Syndicate europeene, No. 9 
[New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9387, at 8841; EEC Press Release, 
April I, 1970, Outline for Common Market's Industrial Policy [New Developments] 2 
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9354. 
396. French Proposal for a European Type Company, 1966 REv. TRIM. DROlT EUR. 
409. An English translation appears in [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] 
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9025 (May 25, 1965) [hereinafter French Proposal]. 
397. EEC Commission Memo, A. European-Type Company, 1966 Bull. E.E.C. Supp. 
9/10, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9100 
(May 3, 1966). 
398. P. SANDERS, EUROPEAN STOCK CORPORATION (transl. CCH 1969) [hereinafter 
Sanders Draft]. 
399. See PROPOSED STATUTE FOR THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, 3 Bull. E.E.C. (Supp. Aug. 
1970) [hereinafter PROPOSED STATUTE]. See generally E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 424-82; 
COMPANY LAw, supra note 395, at 13-17; Ficker, A Project for a European Corporation, 
1970 J. Bus. L. 156, 1971 id. 167; Fornaiser Toward a European Company, 4 CoLUM. 
J. WoRI.D Bus., Sept.-Oct. 1969, at 51; Mann, The European Company, 19 INTL. 
COMP. L.Q. 468 (1970); Sanders, The European Company on Its Way, 8 CoMM. MKT. 
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further changes are expected.400 Although the European company 
(Societas Europa, "S.E.") creates some problems that make it inap-
plicable to all MNEs, many MNEs would find it desirable to operate 
in the EEC in this novel business form. In addition, the adoption of 
this corporate form might serve as the impetus for further develop-
ment of laws responsive to MNEs in general and as a model law for 
legislatures in their consideration of further alignment of the cor-
poration laws of the EEC members.401 The form of company con-
templated by the European company proposal would be truly 
supranational. The company would register with the European com-
mercial register at the Court of Justice402 and would be regulated by 
one legal system of European corporation law.403 The uniformity of 
the interpretation and application of the law relating to European 
companies would be assured by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities,404 which would construe the articles of association, 
interpret the European law, and determine relevant issues governed 
by the statute but not provided for expressly.405 In this respect the 
European company law is contrary to the French proposal that had 
sought uniform national laws to be interpreted primarily by domes-
tic courts. 406 
The European company law addresses the range of questions 
ordinarily covered in a corporation statute. Access to the European 
company form would be provided for stock companies of a multi-
L. R.Ev. 29 (1971) [hereinafter Sanders); Schmitthoff, Multinational Companies, 1970 
INTL. Bus. LAW 167; Scholten, Company Law in Europe, 4 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 377 
(1967); Scholten, The European Company, 5 CoMM. MKT. L. REv. 9 (1967); Storm, supra 
note 172; Storm, Statute of a Societas Europaea, 5 CoMM. MKT. L. R.Ev. 265 (1967); A 
European Company Law in the Making-But Its Opportunity Is Questioned, 7 CoMM. 
MKT, 61 (1967); Note, Merger Movements in the Common Market, 10 VA. J. INTL. L. 119 
(1969). 
400. See EEC Economic and Social Committee, Industry, Research and Technology 
Bull. No. 164, [New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 11 9538 (1972). 
401. See id. at 9202. 
402. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 8, 11. 
403. The company's legal seat must be located within the EEC. The proposal 
provides that the company may have several legal seats. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 
399, art. 5(2). In contrast, the Sanders Draft provided for only one legal seat. Sanders 
Draft, supra note 398, § I-4(1). Article 7(2) of the PROPOSED STATUTE provides that 
national laws would apply to the MNEs on matters not governed by the PROPOSED 
STATUTE. 
404. Since the law of the European company will be adopted as a "regulation" under 
the EEC Treaty, it will be subject to the jurisdiction of the court under section 177 of 
the Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76-77 (1958). 
405. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 7(1). 
406. French Proposal, supra note 396. 
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national character, but not for limited liability companies.407 The 
S.E. would be the corporate form resulting from the merger4°8 of 
national stock companies and the form utilized for joint holding or 
subsidiary companies.409 European companies would also be eligible 
to participate in the formation of another S.E., either by merger or 
by establishment of a new holding company or subsidiary.410 How-
ever, in every instance at least two of the founders must belong to 
different member states of the EEC; and the Commission formally 
restricted applicability of the European company form to member 
states of the EEC.411 
In the internal organization of a European company, stock, issued 
as bearer or restricted shares,412 may be voting (one vote per share)418 
or nonvoting; however, nonvoting stock is subject to certain limita-
tions.414 The corporate management and control structure would 
follow the two-tier German system of a supervisory board and a board 
of management.415 Stockholders would elect the supervisory board, 
and the supervisory board would in turn select the board of manage-
ment.416 The majority of the board of management would consist of 
407. See PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 2. See text accompanying notes 189-
91 supra for the distinction between stock companies and limited liability com-
panies. 
408. Note 2 to PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 2 8: 3 provides: "Merger by 
formation of a new company means, in the present context, amalgamation of two or 
more stock companies limited by shares to form a new legal entity. The founder 
companies cease to exist. [Consequently it] precludes ••• merger by takeover." 
409. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 2 reads: "Societes anonymes [or a 
comparable corporate form] incorporated under the law of a Member State and of 
which not less than two are subject to different national laws may establish an S.E. by 
merger or by formation of a holding company or joint subsidiary." 
410. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 3. 
411. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 2. Articles I-2(1), I-3(1) (c)•(d) of the 
Sanders Draft would allow corporations formed outside the EEC to act as promoters of 
the joint subsidiary in the form of an S.E. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 458, for the 
"access" problem. In practice, however, there is no significant difference. The foreign 
company can use a wholly owned subsidiary within the EEC or obtain the assistance o[ 
a bank, incorporated within the EEC, for the formation of the SE-joint subsidiary. 
Sanders, supra note 399, at 31. 
412. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 50. This is the practice in all of the 
member states except Italy. 
413. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 91(1). 
414. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 49(2). The total nominal value of 
these shares may not exceed the capital. 
415. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 83(c). 
416. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 63(1). See text accompanying notes 
194-97 supra. 
The EEC Commission's recently proposed Fifth Directive on Company Law 
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natural persons and citizens of the member states.417 The principle 
of codetermination by workers in a European company418 remains 
controversial; the Sanders draft proposed to continue codetermina-
tion where it already exists but not to introduce it elsewhere.419 The 
Commission has attempted a general solution by giving the employees 
an option to appoint representatives to the supervisory board.420 
The proposal also sets standards for disclosure of the company's 
accounts.421 Following the pattern of the German law,422 the Euro-
pean company law would require related companies to disclose 
material financial interests and to issue consolidated statements; in 
this manner, the economic and financial relationship between the 
parent and subsidiary corporations will be known to interested cre-
ditors and investors.423 These interested third parties are protected 
under the proposed European company law if any one of the related 
companies is a European company. The controlling company is sub-
ject to joint and several liability when the creditor has "endeavoured, 
and failed, to obtain payment of his debt from the dependent under-
taking."424 
Many of the problems underlying the European company pro-
posal are directly attributable to the emergence of the MNE. The 
Harmonization, which concerns the approximation of national corporate laws in the 
EEC, provides for a dual management system consisting of a supervisory board and 
management board. Fifth Directive, supra note 209. 
417. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 63(2)-(3). If the board of management 
consists of only one or two members, then they must all be nationals of member 
states. Id. 
418. See text accompanying notes 210-33 supra. 
419. Sanders Draft, supra note 398, arts. (V-1-1)-(V-1-4). 
420. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 137-38. The employees will be entitled 
to one third of the members on the board but they may waive this right by a decision 
of two thirds of the employees. Id. 
The Fifth Directive provides two options for employee participation in management 
of companies with 500 or more employees. Under one option, one third of the super-
visory board would be appointed by employees. Under the other, the members of the 
board would be appointed by the board itself but the employees' representatives could 
object to an appointment thereby requiring referral of the appointment to the con-
sideration of an independent body. Fifth Directive, supra note 209. 
421. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 150-222. The rules are based on the 
draft directive for the harmonization of national legislation on the subject under 
article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 38 (1958). 
422 • .AK:rG §§ 177, 325-26, 329-38 (1965). 
423. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 150-222. The Fifth Directive also pro-
vides for shareholder protection through increased disclosure requirements and gen-
eral shareholders' meetings. Fifth Directive, supra note 209. 
424. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 239. 
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focus of the proposal on the economic realities of modem commer-
cial business, with its disregard of the nation-state corporate form, is 
a particularly noteworthy development.426 Acceptance of similar 
proposals by markets not as integrated as the EEC will be very diffi-
cult. Yet, other legal avenues are available on a multinational basis 
to such markets. International agreements and harmonization of 
specific regulatory rules and tax laws, which would not focus on cor-
poration law, remain distinct possibilities.426 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that "[t]he multi-national corporation is an eco-
nomic and political reality of the modem world,"427 the MNE 
remains wit4out an adequate legal framework. Courts have only 
recently recognized the phenomenon of the MNE. As the Interna-
tional Court of Justice remarked in the highly controversial Bar-
celona Traction428 case: 
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the 
growth of foreign investments and the expansion of the international 
activities of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which 
are often multinational, and considering the way in which the eco-
nomic interests of States have proliferated, it may at first sight appear 
surprising that the evolution of the law has not gone further and that 
no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on the 
international plane.429 
In the area of corporation law, MNEs do present novel problems 
and challenges to the legal systems of nation-states in the long run. In 
the foreseeable future, however, concepts traditionally employed in 
the domestic setting can be satisfactorily applied to MNEs. Indeed, 
the decision of the EEC Court in the Dyestuff cases,430 by its applica-
tion of the enterprise theory, stands as the prime example of the 
appropriate legal response to the MNE phenomenon. Under the 
domestically developed enterprise theory,431 disregard of the cor-
425. See, e.g., PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 281 &: note on art. 281. 
426. See, e.g., COMPANY LAw, supra note 395, at 18·19. 
427. WATKINS REPORT, supra note 3, at 355. 
428. Barcelona Traction Light &: Power Co., (Belgium v. Spain) [1970] I.C.J. 3, 
reprinted at 9 INTL. LEGAL MATERIAI.5 227 (1970), and summarized in 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 
653 (1970). 
429. [1970] I.C.J. at 34. 
430. See text accompanying notes 354-68 supra. 
431. See notes 14 &: 263-89 supra and accompanying text. 
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porate entity is justified because a corporation is only a fragment of 
a larger enterprise that actually conducts the business under con-
sideration. In such a case, a larger corporate entity would be held 
financially responsible. Similarly, in a multinational corporate struc-
ture, an individual corporate member should be disregarded in order 
to reach the larger entity that is actually responsible for the activity 
in question. That is not to say that the corporation may be dis-
regarded for all legal purposes. The enterprise theory is applicable 
only to those activities that are in fact attributable to the controlling 
corporation because · those decisions are in fact centralized in the 
international headquarters. Presently, MNEs have decentralized 
much of their decision-making from international headquarters to 
the national level. Such a delegation of power enables local manage-
ment to adapt strategies to the market conditions of the local 
environment and to the demands of governmental authorities. Con-
sequently, for most legal purposes the local corporations of the MNE 
should be the proper object of local legal directives. If the states do 
not effectively reach the appropriate unit of the MNE, national poli-
cies will be frustrated. 
In sum, once legislatures and national authorities are cognizant 
of the organizational and control characteristics of MNEs, they can 
employ various legal theories to protect national interests. First, com-
plete disregard of the corporate entity is justified in exceptional 
circumstances of fraud, evasion of national laws, or when a particular 
corporation does not fulfill substantial business functions. This ex-
treme approach is not applicable to operating subsidiaries, but 
rather applies, for example, to certain intermediate holding com-
panies typically located in tax haven countries.432 Second, while the 
distinct entities of the multiple corporations should be recognized, 
certain transactions should nevertheless be attributed to the con-
trolling corporations. The use of this approach will depend on in-
dividual circumstances and on the specific structure of the MNE in 
question. This partial disregard of the corporate entity is made 
possible by ascertaining the location of the MNE's decision-making 
power with respect to the issue under consideration. States must 
recognize that an MNE's control over its affiliates should be reflected 
in the treatment of these local members of the MNE, which occa-
sionally will lead to treatment different from that accorded to local 
unrelated corporations. For example, tax authorities may interfere 
432. See text accompanying notes 291-300 supra. 
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with the MNE's transfer price decisions in order to protect the 
national revenue.433 Similarly, restrictive arrangements by foreign 
units of the MNE that affect local competition may be prohibited,484 
while at the same time common control over affiliates may justify 
approval of other intercompany restrictive arrangements that other-
wise would be prohibited.435 Third, different criteria may be estab-
lished for corporate "nationality" depending on the legal issues 
involved, in order to apply national policies to the proper segment 
of the MNE.436 
National laws and regulations addressed to MNEs will inevitably 
.produce implications extending beyond national boundaries that 
will clash with the directives or policies of other sovereign states. As 
a result, MNEs may be caught between contradictory policies of two 
or more nations. Conversely, MNEs might avoid effective legal regu-
lation if they were to discover loopholes arising from the lack of in-
tergovernmental cooperation and coordination in a given area. States 
must, therefore, cooperate with each other in reaching common un-
derstandings and international agreements to relieve tension in areas 
such as taxation of the MNE-particularly in regard to intercompany 
transactions,437 conflicting antitrust policies,438 trading with the 
433. See notes 307, 317-18 8c 329 supra and accompanying text. 
434. See notes 348-68 supra and accompanying text. 
435. See text accompanying notes 330-36 supra. 
436. The criteria of corporate nationality will be considered in greater depth in the 
second Article. 
437. Tax treaties should be adapted to the MNE to include rules for allocating and 
adjusting income as well as more satisfactory mutual agreement procedures. 
438. Currently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) plays the major role in relieving the tension of international antitrust frictions. 
Its Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices is comprised of government 
experts from the member states. This group exchanges antitrust information, helps 
to develop national laws, and has initiated the multivolume GumE TO WORLD LEcISLA· 
TION OF R.EsnuCTIVE BUSINESS PRAcnCES. See J. Rahl, supra note 349, at 454-59. The 
current procedure was adopted in October 1967 by a Recommendation of the Council 
of the OECD Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. (C)(67)53 (Final), in 
J. Rahl, at 456-57. Under the procedure, a country has to notify other member states 
of any antitrust investigation or proceeding involving important interests of these 
members. Such a notification gives an opportunity to consider the view of the other 
members prior to any unilateral act, para. l(a). The procedure provides for exchanges 
of information among the members insofar as "their laws and legitimate interests 
permit them to disclose," para. 2. 
The cooperative procedure developed by the OECD was spurred by the effective 
procedure in international antitrust between the United States and Canada. The 
latter cooperation emerged out of the Canadian-United States consultations with 
respect to the Canadian Electronic Patents case. United States v. General Elec. Co., 
Civil No. 140-157 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 24, 1958), settled by a consent decree, 1962 Trade 
Cas. ,r 70,546 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The same consent decrees were entered against Westing-
house, 1962 Trade Cas. ,r 70,428 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) and Philips, 1962 Trade Cas. ,r 70,342 
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enemy acts, export control regulations, securities laws, foreign invest-
ment laws, and to promote proper corporate behavior and responsi-
bilities toward the states in which the MNE operates. Each field of 
law can be the subject of a separate arrangement, since it would be 
difficult if not impossible to develop a single arrangement capable of 
covering most of these issues.439 In addition to the attempts to reach 
international agreements in each area of conflict and friction, efforts 
should be made to establish an international forum that will allow 
MNEs and the competent authorities of the states to discuss the areas 
of conflict in order to encourage mutual understanding and to work 
out a procedure to solve actual conflicts.440 Until international agree-
ments of mutual understandings are concluded, the states should 
individually exercise their legislative powers cautiously, in order to 
avoid international conflicts with or discrimination against multina-
tional business.441 
At this point in time there is no pressing need for a supranational 
corporation law under the direction of an international institution,442 
except perhaps in regional markets such as the European Common 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). In 1959, Canada's Minister of Justice and Attorney General, David 
Fulton, and his United States counterpart, \\Tilliam Rogers, arrived at an in-
formal agreement, called the Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure, de• 
signed to eliminate friction and to encourage common understanding of antitrust 
problems affecting the two countries. Hearings on Intemational Aspects of Antitrust 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1966). The procedure has been strengthened by 
a later Joint Statement, issued in November 1969, by the Canadian Minister Ron 
Basford and the United States Attorney General, John Mitchell. U.S. Dept. of Justice 
Press Release, Nov. 3, 1969 (mimeo). See J. Rahl, supra, at 447-48. The procedure pro-
vides for notification of antitrust proceedings affecting the other country, a consultation 
procedure, exchange of information of "activities or situations" affecting international 
trade, and, whenever possible, coordination of the enforcement of antitrust laws. 
439. Thus, the proposal of an international mechanism similar to GATT applicable 
to all MNEs would not be feasible at this stage. See, e.g., Goldberg &: Kindleberger, 
supra note 2, advocating such a procedure for international investment. Cf. Rubin, 
supra note 2, disagreeing with the idea of a GATT for investment but going too far 
in rejecting the need for separate international arrangements in some of the areas of 
conflict. 
440. The current procedure concerning international antitrust conflicts between the 
United States and Canada under the mutual agreement procedure under bilateral 
ta.x treaties may serve as a starting point. See Hadari, supra note 179, at 134-35, 
for a discussion of agreement through tax treaties. 
441. An example of a unilateral exemption designed to facilitate international 
business is the SEC regulation, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1972), which exempts certain 
securities issued by foreign issuers from the disclosure requirements of section 12g of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78l(g) (1970), to the extent that disclosure 
of the information in question is not required or disclosed by the issuer in his country. 
See Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the Foreign Issuer Exemption: A Study in the 
Process of Accommodating Foreign Interests, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 358 (1969). 
442. See, e.g., Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, 2 CoLUM. J. 
WoRLD Bus., Nov.•Dec. 1967, at 25. 
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Market. Most MNEs are not in fact truly multinational,443 but rather 
are still identified with their home countries; it is not anticipated 
that such enterprises are ready to incorporate internationally. More-
over, the conflict among corporation laws on the international level 
has not reached the stage at which multinational investments are 
significantly impeded. Consequently, states have not yet moved to 
reach an innovative multinational agreement, since it is not yet a 
priority item. If, however, the European company proposal is effec-
tuated successfully, it may provide a new stimulant to the concept of 
a world company. Future developments in the European Common 
Market should be monitored carefully, especially with the admission 
of the United Kingdom and Ireland, which may lead to greater har-
monization of civil and common law. 
443. See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra. 
